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3 
Introduction 
 
At anchor in the drowsy and deserted harbor of Phuket, a tiny, pear-shaped island 
hugging the southwest coast of Thailand, lay a trim, black motor ship. When the 
sky darkened she swung in a wide arc and slipped out past two rock islands 
sheltering the mouth of the harbor. She ran without lights. A red and white 
Indonesian Republican flag fluttered from her stern. And as she sped southward 
across the Malacca Strait, an Indonesian-born Chinese stood at her helm. His name 
is John Lie.1 
 
In 1949, Roy Rowan, a journalist of LIFE magazine, wrote the article from which the above 
quote was taken, dealing with the clandestine activities executed by Indonesian Republicans 
and people of other nationalities. The article mainly focuses on the smuggling of arms into the 
areas occupied by the Republic of Indonesia. It shows that while Thailand did not officially 
take sides in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict, some Thais were actively involved in unofficial 
trades with the Republic. As none of the existing historiography has examined the connection 
between Thailand and Indonesia during the latter’s war of independence, this thesis aims to 
explore the position and role of Thailand in the conflict. This study is important as it will further 
the understanding of Thai foreign policies as well as the structure of world politics in the post-
WWII era. The main research questions of this thesis are: (1) How did the relations, both 
official and unofficial, between Thailand and Indonesia develop during the Indonesian 
Revolution? And (2) why did the Thai-Indonesian relations develop in such ways? This thesis 
argues that Thailand took a hypocritically neutral stance during the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. 
Shortly before the conflict ended, Thailand, however, shifted to a pro-Indonesian stance. This 
change of Thailand’s position was to a certain extent a result of the US’s stance on the issue. 
 
Previous Related Studies 
 
It is indisputable that Indonesia did not obtain its independence in December 1949 solely as a 
result of the fighting against the Dutch in the area formerly called the Netherlands East Indies, 
nor did the Dutch grant Indonesia its sovereignty as an act of mercy. The success of Indonesia 
in getting its independence also depended heavily on the international support. The US, which 
																																																						
1 NL-HaNA, Gezantschap Thailand, 2.05.246, inv.nr. 343, Roy Rowan, “Guns and Bibles are 
smuggled to Indonesia,” LIFE, September 26, 1949. 
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emerged as the hegemon in the new international system after the WWII, played a decisive role 
in settling the Dutch-Indonesian conflict, and a number of other countries influenced the course 
of the conflict.  
 Since international support was vital to the conflict, scholars in the field of Indonesian 
Revolution studies have paid much attention to the diplomatic support from Western nations. 
In the wake of WWII, according to Oey Hong Lee, the UK was the first country that mediated 
negotiations between the Netherlands and the Republic. This assistance led to the conclusion 
of the Linggajati Agreement in 1946.2 The Agreement, however, did not solve the conflict 
peacefully. Another publication by Lee suggests that the US became involved in the conflict 
after the Dutch had launched a military campaign in July 1947. The US offered its good offices 
for negotiations and became one of the principal mediators. Yet, it took a mostly pro-Dutch 
stance. Only later did the US change its position and pressure the Dutch to grant sovereignty 
to Indonesia, by suspending economic aid of which the Netherlands was badly in need.3  
 Putting US foreign policies regarding the Dutch-Indonesian conflict in the context of 
the Cold War, Robert J. McMahon answers the question why the US changed its stance. 
Immediately after World War II, the main focus of the US was to prevent Europe from falling 
to Communism. The American policymakers thought that the well-being of the European 
economy would keep Europe away from communism. In the case of the Netherlands, its colony 
in Southeast Asia was necessary for the restoration of the Dutch economy. The US thus 
supported the Dutch to reoccupy Indonesia. The US, however, began to change its stance when 
it realized that the war between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic might replace the 
nationalists with communists. After the Republic crushed its communist fraction in 1948, the 
US became fully supportive of the Indonesian cause.4  
 Frances Gouda and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg share this view. The US, as they argue, 
reoriented its foreign policy in 1948. In the eyes of American policymakers, Western Europe 
became relatively safe from communism as its economy had already stabilized. Asia then 
																																																						
2 Oey Hong Lee, “British-Dutch relations and the Republic of Indonesia”, Asian Affairs 3 (1976): 35-
53. 
3 Oey Hong Lee, War and Diplomacy in Indonesia 1945-1950 (Townsville, Australia: Committee of 
South-East Asian Studies, James Cook University of North Queensland, 1981). 
4 Robert J. McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981). 
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became the new focal point of US foreign policy. The destruction of communist Republicans 
in 1948 therefore made the Americans support the Republic.5 
 The Dutch-Indonesian conflict was also settled under the auspices of an international 
organization, namely the UN. In fact, the negotiations between the disputed parties were not 
mediated by individual nations. They were mediated by the UN-established bodies: the 
Committee of Good Offices (GOC) and the United Commission for Indonesia (UNCI). The 
US, according to Alastair M. Taylor, was dominant in these bodies and could lobby other 
members to follow its opinion regarding the conflict. The way in which the UN solved the 
Indonesian question thus depended considerably on the US.6  
 So far it can be seen that historians generally accept that the US was a decisive factor 
in the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia. It could lobby other nations that mediated the 
negotiations and could force the Dutch directly through its economic power. The capacity of 
the US in settling the conflict, as suggested by these works, implies the dominant status of the 
US in world politics after the WWII. 
 In addition to the role of the US, however, some scholars have highlighted the 
significant roles of several newly emerging countries in assisting the Republic of Indonesia. 
This trend of research argues that the Republic had received crucial support especially from 
India and Australia in the period before the US became interested in the Dutch-Indonesian 
conflict. This trend also implies the solidarity of newly emerging countries, some of which 
would later go on to unite into the so-called “non-aligned movement” that aimed to be the third 
alternative in the bipolar politics of the Cold War. 
 Although Australia did not express its opinion on the Dutch-Indonesian conflict 
immediately after the WWII, its labor unions, according to Rupert Lockwood, started to back 
Indonesia as early as 1945 by boycotting the ships that would reinforce the Dutch army in 
reoccupying the Indonesian archipelago.7 Later, the Labor government of Australia officially 
supported the Republic of Indonesia after the first Dutch aggression by introducing the issue 
of Dutch violence to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).8 
																																																						
5 Frances Gouda and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, American Visions of the Netherlands East 
Indies/Indonesia: US Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism, 1920-1949 (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2002). 
6 Alastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations (London: Stevens & Sons 
limited, 1960). 
7 Rupert Lockwood, Black Armada (Sydney: Australian Book Society, 1975). 
8 Margaret George, Australia and the Indonesian Revolution (Melbourne: Melbourne University 
Press, 1980). 
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 During the Dutch-Indonesian conflict, Indian support for the Republic was second to 
none. Research by P.R.S. Mani has shown that Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Indian prime 
minister, had promised to support Indonesia even before India obtained its full independence. 
Besides Australia, India was another country that raised the matter of Dutch aggression to the 
UNSC. India played another crucial part in the conflict after the second Dutch aggression. It 
arranged a conference in New Delhi that raised support and sympathy for Indonesia. The 
resolutions from this conference were subsequently submitted to the UNSC as 
recommendations.9 The support from India and Australia for the Republic, in Samuel E. 
Crowl’s opinion, initiated cooperation among the newly emerging countries. Later this 
cooperation, as Crowl argues, offered the international system of the Cold War era another 
alternative that neither aligned with the US nor the USSR.10 
 Most of the works discussed so far were written between the 1960s and 1980s. These 
works tended to approach the topic of the Indonesian mainly through the diplomatic aspect. 
However, there was a shift in the way in which historians approach the topic from the 1990s 
onwards. A new set of works tended to study forms of indirect or unofficial support for the 
Indonesian cause.  
  In Singapore and the Indonesian Revolution 1945-50, Suryono Darusman, a former 
staff member of the Indonesia office in Singapore, recorded the roles of Singapore, its 
government, and its people during the Indonesian Revolution. He argues that Singapore was 
an important base of support for Indonesia from outside. According to Darusman, Singapore’s 
government was tolerant towards Indonesians and their illegal activities. The people of 
Singapore also sympathized with the struggle of the Indonesians. Moreover, the Chinese 
businessmen proved to be efficient in the trades between Singapore and Indonesia even when 
there was a Dutch blockade. Lastly, post-WWII Singapore was a giant warehouse of military 
equipment including arms—the most needed material for the struggle of Indonesia against its 
colonizer.11 
 A more in-depth study about Singapore in the Indonesian Revolution is that of Yong 
Mun Cheong. He examines the rise and fall of trade activities including the smuggling of arms 
																																																						
9 P. R. S. Mani, The Story of Indonesian Revolution (Madras: University of Madras, 1986). 
10 Samuel E. Crowl, “Indonesia’s Diplomatic Revolution: Lining Up for Non-Alignment, 1945-1955”, 
in: Connecting Histories: Decolonisation and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945-1962, eds 
Christopher E. Goscha and Christian F. Ostermann (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 
2009). 
11 Suryono Darusman, Singapore and the Indonesian Revolution, 1945-50: Recollections of Suryono 
Darusman (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992). 
  
7 
between Singapore and Indonesia and concludes that trades were more difficult to conduct as 
the Dutch tightened their blockade during the last period before the war of independence ended. 
A similar story of trades between Singapore and the Republic can also be found in The Chinese 
Business Elite in Indonesia and the Transition to Independence by Twang Peck Yang.12 
Although these works give us a new perspective on the issue of international support for the 
Indonesian freedom struggle, they confine their scope only to Singapore as if it was the only 
place that extended unofficial support to the Republic. 
 Regarding the connection between Thailand and the Indonesian Revolution, there is 
only one brief article by Omar Farouk Bajunid. Based exclusively on interviews with several 
Indonesians in Thailand, he wrote on the formation and activities of an organization called the 
Indonesian Independence League. This organization was established in 1946 and aimed to 
support the Republic on the world stage by urging the Thai government to recognize the 
Republican government. Unfortunately, it largely failed to do so.13 
 From the survey of the existing literature, one can conclude that attention is mainly paid 
to the diplomatic support from the US, the UK, India, and Australia. To a lesser extent, scholars 
have also studied unofficial support from Singapore. From the fact that Singapore was still a 
British colony during the Indonesian Revolution and the article by Bajunid is not conclusive, 
it is fair to say that scholars have not fully studied roles and positions of other independent 
countries in Southeast Asia towards to the conflict.  
 Since Indonesia is also located in the region of Southeast Asia, scholars should pay 
more attention to the politics of this region. It should be noted that Myanmar, the Philippines, 
and Thailand were independent countries in Southeast Asia during the Indonesian Revolution. 
Although the roles of Myanmar and the Philippines have not been fully studied, their stance in 
the conflict is mentioned. As former colonies themselves, they tended to support the 
Indonesians.14 Such a clear position, however, could not be seen from Thailand until it 
																																																						
12 Yong Mun Cheong, The Indonesian Revolution and the Singapore Connection (Leiden: KITLV 
Press, 2003); Twang Peck Yang, The Chinese Business Elite in Indonesia and the Transition to 
Independence 1940-1950 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
13 Omar Farouk Bajunid, “The Indonesian Independence League in Bangkok”, JEBAT 14 (1986): 
117-125. 
14 In fact, U Nu, Myanmar’s Prime Minister, urged Nehru to arrange a conference to support 
Indonesia after the second Police Action. See Mani, The Story of Indonesian Revolution, 100. The 
Philippines declared its support to the Republic of Indonesia as early as 1945. At the New Delhi 
conference in 1949, it also showed its support to Indonesia in the resolutions concluded at the 
conference. See Bajunid, “The Indonesian Independence League in Bangkok,” 119; and Russell 
Fifield, “Philippine Foreign Policy”, Far Eastern Survey 4(1951): 37.  
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officially recognized the Republic at a very late stage of the conflict, as will be shown in this 
thesis.  
 The reason why Thailand was silent in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict may lie in the 
foreign policy tradition of neutrality which Thailand had long adopted since the nineteenth 
century. As Charivat Santaputra states in Thai Foreign Policy, 1932-1946, the major concern 
of Thailand during the period of high colonialism until WWII was to maintain its 
independence. It established relations with all Western nations that came into contact without 
favoritism. This neutrality enabled Thailand to play one country against another whenever 
there were threats to its freedom.15 Similar remarks are made in “Thailand’s Foreign Policy: 
An Analysis of its evolution since World War II” by Liang Chi Shad. He also observed two 
major shifts in Thai foreign policy after WWII. Shad claims that there was a short period 
between 1945-1947 in which Thailand was relatively favorable towards the Asian struggle for 
independence. However, this policy ended with the coming of the Phibun government in 1948 
(also see chapter 1 below). From then on, Thailand adopted a neutral stance once again. Yet, it 
was inclined to prioritize good relations with the US. Thailand eventually aligned with the US 
in 1950 because of the rise of communism in Asia.16 In A Special Relationship, Daniel Fineman 
also agrees that Thailand began to turn to the US in 1948. Yet, in his analysis it was not because 
of the communist threat. Phibun chose to align with the US in 1950 in exchange for American 
aid that was necessary for stabilizing his government. This decision of Phibun, to cite Fineman, 
was a “revolution” of the Thai foreign policy as it broke a long tradition of neutrality.17 
Surprisingly, the official recognition of the Indonesian Republic by Thailand came at the time 
when the Thai government was negotiating the American aid with Washington. 
 In the light of these studies, it is interesting to study the Thai-Indonesian relations 
during the Indonesian Revolution because such a study can test the understanding of Thai 
foreign policy after WWII. Was it really initially favorable towards Indonesian struggle for 
independence, (how) did that stance change, and what were the factors that contributed to the 
Thai position? The study of Thai-Indonesian relations also contributes a clearer picture of the 
post-WWII international system in which the US had the hegemonic status. Moreover, this 
																																																						
15 Charivat Santaputra, Thai Foreign Policy, 1932-1946 (Bangkok: Thai Khadi Research Institute, 
1985). 
16 Liang Chi Shad, Thailand's Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Its Evolution since World War II, 
Occasional Paper Series of the Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, College of Graduate 
Studies, Nanyang University; No. 73 (Singapore: Nanyang University, College of Graduate Studies, 
Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, 1977). 
17 Daniel Fineman, A Special Relationship: The United States and military government in Thailand, 
1947-1958 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997). 
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study of Thai-Indonesian relations suggest that Singapore was not the only place that gave 
Indonesia indirect support. Finally, in contrast to the case of India and Australia, this study of 
the case of Thai support suggests that Thailand did not support Indonesia because it wanted to 
initiate cooperation among peripheral countries which occurred in the post-WWII era. 
 
Materials and Methods 
  
In this thesis, I rely mainly on materials gathered in the archive of the Dutch legation in 
Bangkok and the archive of the Far East Department. These archives consist of various kinds 
of documents. All of them are kept at the National Archive in The Hague. Most of them are 
letters, telegrams, and reports which were sent from the Dutch legation in Bangkok to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague or to other Dutch legations in Southeast Asia and 
vice versa. Some materials are newspapers clippings from Thailand. Some materials are 
confiscated or intercepted from the Republicans by the Dutch intelligence service. Since the 
Netherlands held high stakes in the conflict, the Dutch legation in Bangkok followed the 
activities and movements of the republicans who worked in Thailand closely. Consequently, 
these archives give extensive insights into the activities of Indonesian agents as well as the 
trilateral relations between Thailand, the Netherlands, and the Republic of Indonesia. Yet, it 
should be noted that these materials were created from the Dutch perspective. At times, it can 
be difficult to extract from these materials what the Thais were really thinking regarding the 
Dutch-Indonesian conflict because, out of diplomatic courtesy, the Thais generally inclined to 
be nice to the Dutch. Future research should therefore further include material from Thai 
archives that were not available to me while writing this thesis.  
 Memoirs also constitute an integral part of the material for this thesis. The most 
important one was written by John Coast, a Briton who worked with the Indonesian 
representative in Bangkok. His memoir, Recruit to Revolution: Adventure and Politics during 
the Indonesian Struggle for Independence, is a very useful record of the Republicans’ activities 
in Thailand, although it is naturally heavily colored by Coast’s sympathies and perspectives. 
Coast was acquainted and interacted with all the important actors in Thai-Indonesian relations. 
His memoir shows the way in which the Republicans approached Thai elites.18 Beside Coast’s, 
I use a memoir written by Konthi Suphamongkhon, former Director-General of the Department 
																																																						
18 John Coast, Laura Noszlopy, and Adrian Vickers, Recruit to Revolution: Adventure and Politics 
during the Indonesian Struggle for Independence (Copenhagen: Nias Press, 2015). 
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of Western Politics at the Thai Foreign Office. Although his memoirs does not mention 
anything directly related to the issue of Thai-Indonesian relations, it provides useful insights 
into the attitude of the author towards colonialism and the general tendencies of Thai foreign 
policies at the time.19 
 Yet, there are two limitations regarding the sources. Firstly, apart from newspapers 
clippings and a memoir, it was not possible for me during the writing of this thesis to access 
other Thai primary sources. Secondly, without the ability to read Bahasa Indonesia, I cannot 
work with untranslated sources in Indonesian. To compensate for this, I use secondary 
literature on Thai foreign policy. All of them are mention above. For the Indonesian foreign 
policies, I rely on the works of Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung.20  
 Although the issue of the Indonesian Revolution involves both the Netherlands and the 
Republic of Indonesia equally, this thesis pays more attention to the Thai-Indonesian relations, 
albeit mainly through the lens of Dutch sources, as they were the party standing in the way of 
official Thai-Indonesian diplomatic relations. 
 This thesis examines the Thai-Indonesian relations through aspects both of official 
diplomatic relations and of unofficial relations, in this case: (illicit) trade and movements of 
people to and from the Republic. The explanation of why Thailand acted in the way it did will 
be drawn from the concerns that Thailand had in that period. In other words, this thesis also 
looks at the relations between Thailand and the Netherlands as well as some of Thailand’s 
internal issues at the time. 
 This thesis is divided into two chapters. The first chapter seeks to answer how the idea 
of an official recognition of the Republic by the Thai government developed. It identifies the 
agents who pushed the issue forward and the reasons for the Thai government to stall. How did 
Indonesian agents approach the Thai government? How did the Thai government respond? 
How did Thai officials deal with the political status of the Republic when they attended 
international conferences? And when did Thailand finally recognize the Republic of Indonesia? 
 The second chapter explores unofficial relations — trade and movement of people — 
between Thailand and the Republic. What kinds of activities were executed in Thailand? Who 
were involved in these activities? How were these activities done? To what extent did these 
																																																						
19 Konthi Suphamongkhon, On the foreign policy of Thailand during 1940-1952 (การวิเทโศบายของไทย: 
ระหว่างปีพทุธศักราช 2483 ถึง 2495) (Bangkok: Arun Press, 2013).  
20 Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Twenty years Indonesian foreign policy 1945-1965 (Yogyakarta: 
Duta Wacana university press, 1990). 
  
11 
activities succeed? In other words, were these unofficial relations prohibited, encouraged, or 
met by a neutral stance by the Thai government? 
 Although historical evidence clearly shows Thailand’s involvement in the Indonesian 
Revolution, Thailand fails to feature in the existing literature of the topic. Since the study of 
Thai-Indonesian relations may advance our understanding of the Thai foreign policies and the 
post-WWII international system, this thesis will explore these relations in the pages that follow. 
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Chapter 1 - A Friend of All Is a Friend to None: The Diplomatic Relations 
between Thailand and the Republic of Indonesia, 1945-1949 
 
To understand Thailand’s position in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict, this chapter 
chronologically examines the process of granting recognition to the Republic by the Thai 
government. It looks at the Indonesian agents who approached the Thai government, the 
strategy they used, the reaction from the Thais, as well as the reasons why Thailand chose to 
develop such positions. 
 After the war, there was a short period between 1945 and 1947 in which Thailand 
deviated from the policy of neutrality and supported the fight of Southeast Asian countries 
against their colonizers. The government under Pridi Banomyong aided nationalists in Laos, 
Cambodia, and Vietnam by sending weapons into the French Indochina. Thailand was also the 
headquarters of the Southeast Asia League, a short-lived regional front against colonialism that 
was founded in September 1947. But in 1948, Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram ascended to his 
second premiership. Phibun21 wanted to erase his war-time image of a Japanese ally so he 
adopted an overwhelmingly pro-western policy to please the former Allied powers, especially 
the US and the UK. Eventually, Thailand fully abandoned its neutrality and formally aligned 
itself with the US in 1950 because of the rise of communist threats in Asia.22 From this 
background, it may be concluded that Thailand was generally neutral in world politics but it 
would take side when there was a necessity. In this chapter it will be explored how these general 
tendencies of Thai foreign policies came to the fore in Thai-Indonesian relations.  
 
1.2 So Close, Yet So Far: Thai-Indonesian Relations in 1947 
 
After the Republic of Indonesia had proclaimed its independence in August 1945, diplomacy 
was chosen as the primary means for obtaining its full freedom. The Republic’s major foreign 
policies during the revolution were as followed: to obtain recognition from other countries, to 
defend its freedom, and to settle the Dutch-Indonesian conflict through negotiations with the 
help of mediators. Sutan Sjahrir, who became the prime minister in November 1945, operated 
these policies by sending Indonesian representatives to establish relations with India, Pakistan, 
and Egypt. According to Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Sjahrir chose India and Pakistan because 
																																																						
21 Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram will be referred to as “Phibun” for the rest of this thesis. 
22 Shad, Thailand’s foreign policy: 6-7; and Fineman, Special Relation: 66-67. 
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they were going to be independent.23 Surprisingly enough, he did not send a representative to 
Thailand, the only independent neighboring country in Southeast Asia at the time. The early 
stage of contact between Thailand and the Republic had been left to the Indonesian community 
in Bangkok before any official representatives arrived.  
 After WWII, there were approximately 4,000 Indonesians in Thailand. Most people of 
the community had come before the war and stayed in Thailand for more than two decades. A 
smaller group of the community had just been transported to Thailand during the war as labor 
for the Japanese army. Yet, the exact number of each group was not known. These people still 
contacted their families in Indonesia and were interested in the political developments of the 
archipelago. In Bangkok, the Indonesian community was centered in a Javanese mosque in 
Sathorn district. The community became aware of its duty in the Indonesian Revolution and 
formed the Indonesian Independence League (Persatuan Indonesia Merdeka) in 1946.24  
 The league consisted of about 500 members. It was led by Captain Mohamed Shariff 
bin Taib who was the chairman and treasurer. Mahmud bin Samarn was the league’s secretary. 
Beside these two head figures, there were seven committee members who ran the league and 
arranged activities in Thailand. This organization was located in Bangrak district not far from 
the Javanese mosque.25 
 The league’s main agenda was to balance the information concerning the Dutch-
Indonesian conflict, because all the news on the issue was being manipulated by the Dutch 
legation in Bangkok. This effort was viewed by the league’s leaders as complementing the on-
going international campaign. However, the most immediate task in the league’s opinion was 
to have a dialogue with the Thai government in order to obtain support in the form of 
recognition of the Republican government. As mentioned earlier, Sjahrir did not send an 
official representative to Thailand; the league’s acted entirely on its own initiative.26 
 This first mission was helped by Chaem Phromyong or Haji Shamsuddin, who was the 
Thai minister counsellor for Muslim affairs at that time. Chaem was a close colleague of Pridi 
Banomyong, the Thai prime minister between March and August 1946. Pridi’s27 was succeeded 
as prime minister by his nominee, Admiral Thamrongnavasawat. Pridi himself became a 
																																																						
23 Agung, Indonesian foreign policy: 29-30. 
24 Bajunid, “Indonesian Independence League”,: 117-119; and National Archives The Hague (NL-
HaNA), Dutch diplomatic representative in Siam/Thailand (Gezantschap Thailand), 2.05.246, inv.nr. 
343, Polderman to Directie Verre Oosten (Far East Department - DIRVO), 20 July 1948, 
3064/0.201.212.202.1/61. 
25 Bajunid, “Indonesian Independence League”,: 120. 
26 Ibid. 
27 It is customary to call Thai people by their first name. 
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statesman but could still control the government. Thanks to his personal connection, Chaem 
managed to schedule a meeting between Pridi and the Indonesian league.28 The league hoped 
that Pridi might be able to persuade the Thai government to recognize the Republic of 
Indonesia. Although it is not known exactly when this meeting took place, it must have taken 
place somewhere between July and August 1947. It will be explained below why the meeting 
occurred in that period.  
 In the first quarter of 1947, the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands signed the 
Linggajati Agreement. According to this agreement, the Netherlands would transfer its 
sovereignty to a projected United States of Indonesia, of which the Republic would form a 
component, in January 1949. In the meantime, the agreement recognized that the Republic had 
de facto authority over large parts of Java, Sumatra, and Madura. As a result of this agreement, 
the UK, the US, Australia, China, India and a number of Arab states recognized the Republic’s 
de facto status.29  
 After signing the agreement on March 25, Sjahrir arrived in New Delhi on March 31. 
He was there to attend the Asian Relations Conference that had been organized by the 
government of India. There, Sjahrir met with the Thai foreign minister, Attakij Banomyong, a 
half-brother of Pridi. At the conference, Attakij invited Sjahrir to come to Thailand and discuss 
the matter of the recognition of the Indonesian Republic.30 This occasion may have brought 
Sjahrir’s attention to Thailand for the first time. 
 On his way back to Indonesia, Sjahrir stopped over in Thailand. He arrived on April 7 
at Don Muang, an airfield in the north of Bangkok. At Don Muang, there were many people 
waiting for the arrival of Sjahrir. Among them were the Indian vice-consul, a group of people 
from the Indonesian community, a representative of the Vietnamese delegation, and B.A. Piets, 
the Dutch charge d’affaires. However, there were neither Thai civil servants nor representatives 
of the Thai government. In Piets’ opinion, it was Sjahrir’s first visit to Thailand and he was 
officially not a guest of the Thai government. The Thais may have thought that it would be 
better if Sjahrir was received by the Dutch legation. Nevertheless, Piets reported, Sjahrir 
seemed disappointed by his reception in Thailand.31  
																																																						
28 Bajunid, “Indonesian Independence League”,: 121. 
29 Lee, War and diplomacy: 127; and Taylor, Indonesian Independence: 33. 
30 Coast, Recruit to Revolution: 58. 
31 NL-HaNA, Gezantschap Thailand, 2.05.246, inv.nr. 350, Piets to DIRVO, 15 April 1947, 13/303c. 
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 At the airfield, Piets invited Sjahrir to a ride around Bangkok. Sjahrir accepted the offer 
but said he had to meet other delegates at the Suriyanond Hotel first. Later the Dutch legation 
came to know that he went to see Admiral Thamrongnavasawat and Attakij.32  
 After dinner, Sjahrir was accommodated at the Dutch Legation. There Piets had an 
opportunity to exchange opinions with Sjahrir. In his letter to the chief of the Far East 
Department, Piets reported that Sjahrir had been disappointed by his conversation with the Thai 
prime minister. From the fact that Sjahrir talked about the urgency to stimulate the spirit of 
Asian people, Piets got the impression that the Thai prime minister might not share the spirit 
for Asian solidarity which Sjahrir had expected. Nevertheless, Piets concluded in his letter that 
the relations between Thailand and the Republic would soon develop. He therefore suggested 
to  the Far East Department to send non-Republican Indonesian representatives to Bangkok in 
order to counterbalance the activities of the Republicans.33 
 The Linggajati Agreement did not assure a peaceful cooperation towards the 
independence of Indonesia. It lasted only from March to July 1947. During these four months, 
the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic continually blamed each other for not 
implementing the Agreement. The Netherlands established a series of small states under its 
sponsorship while the Republic undertook its own foreign affairs, which was not allowed by 
the agreement. The dispute eventually led to a military campaign by the Dutch on July 21, 
1947. This campaign became known as the First Police Action.34 
 In the morning of that day, Sjahrir boarded the plane of Biju Patnaik, an Indian 
businessman who happened to be in Jogjakarta, and left for Singapore. On 23 July, he 
continued his journey to India on a British commercial plane.35 The plane must have stopped 
over in Bangkok as the members of the Indonesian Independence League claimed that they 
were briefed on the latest developments in Indonesia just before the scheduled meeting with 
Pridi took place.36 Yet, this arrival of Sjahrir in Bangkok cannot be confirmed in other sources. 
 It is clear now that the aforementioned meeting between the league and Pridi must have 
taken place in mid-1947. Surprisingly, during the conversation Pridi claimed that there had 
been no official contact with the Republic. Provided that Sjahrir did not send representatives 
to Thailand in 1945 and that he had only met some Thai politicians informally for the first time 
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around April 1947, there may have been no official contact as Pridi claimed. Nevertheless, 
Pridi, sympathising with the Indonesians, encouraged the league to ask the Republican 
government to send an official delegation to Thailand. The league’s representatives promised 
to take action immediately.37 
 Around September 1947, Haji Khasruddin, an Indonesian activist, came to Bangkok. 
He had several meetings with Shariff, the chairman of the League. Khasruddin was persuaded 
to go back to Indonesia. The plan was to request Mohammad Hatta, the vice president of the 
Republic, for an official delegation to seek Thai recognition of the Republican government. In 
Bukit Tinggi (Sumatra), Hatta was informed about Pridi’s sympathy for the Republic. 
Consequently, he instructed Sudarsono, the Indonesian representative in India, to make a 
formal visit to Thailand.38 At this point, it can be seen that the Republic began to contact 
Thailand officially. Although Sjahrir met some Thai politicians in March and April, he might 
not have made any further contact with the Thai government because he resigned from the 
office in June. This might be the reason why the Indonesian Independence League could take 
an active role in mediating with the Thais. 
 Another Indonesian young man came to Thailand in October 1947. He would soon 
become an important figure of the Republican affairs in Thailand until the transfer of 
sovereignty to Indonesia in 1949. His name was Ishak Mahdi. Before coming to Bangkok, he 
was a representative of Bank Negara and an economic adviser of the Indonesia Office in 
Singapore. In Bangkok, he had a meeting with Shariff at Hotel Europe where Mahdi himself 
was staying. He explained to Shariff that he had been sent to Bangkok to assist Sudarsono who 
would soon visit Bangkok to discuss the recognition of the Republic by the Thai government.39 
 Meanwhile on October 7, Liberty, one of two English language newspapers in Thailand, 
reported that Dr. Zain and Mrs. Tanya were coming to Bangkok to represent the Republic of 
Indonesia. The Dutch Legation in Bangkok was surely unpleasantly surprised by this news. 
Piets called on Admiral Thamrongnavasawat and Kenneth Patton, the American advisor of the 
Thai government. Both the prime minister and the advisor were as surprised as the Dutch 
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diplomat since they did not know the people in the news. It is clear from the date on the letter 
from Piets to the chief of the Far East Department that those Indonesians mentioned in the news 
did not arrive in Bangkok even after the news had been released for more than ten days.40 
 Whether the news about Dr. Zain was true or false is not so important here. Considering 
this news together with the arrival of Mahdi, it clearly shows that an official Republican 
representative was scheduled to arrive sometime soon. The Dutch were also concerned about 
this and tried to interfere by communicating with the Thais. 
 The prospect of the recognition of the Republic by Thailand seemed very promising in 
1947. Pridi seemed to be supportive of the recognition and the official representative of the 
Republic was on the way to Bangkok. Despite these facts, the Indonesians would shortly find 
themselves heartbroken. 
 On November 8, there was a coup by the Thai military. Pridi and his nominee lost their 
power. Khuang Aphaiwong, a royalist from the conservative Democrat party, was appointed 
to be the next prime minister. Two weeks later, this coup was endorsed by the Thai King who 
resided in Switzerland.41 Although the Thai political scene had already changed and any 
contact with Pridi had been suspended due to the political uncertainty, Mahdi ignored the 
warning by the Indonesian Independence League and went to see the new prime minister. The 
result was disappointing. Khuang explained to Mahdi that Thailand could not grant the 
Republic recognition because his government also had to secure its own recognition by others, 
especially the Western nations. When Sudarsono arrived in Thailand days later, he too failed 
to secure any support from the Thai government.42 
 In an official answer to the government of the Republic, the Thai government expressed 
its sympathy towards the struggle for independence. However, Thailand as a member of the 
UN, claimed that it had to follow the resolutions of the organization. The Thai government 
stressed that Thailand was also in a difficult period, so it did not have time to study the current 
conflict in Indonesia. It also said the reception of the Indonesian delegation was not meant to 
be considered as official diplomatic protocol and that the granting of visa to Sudarsono should 
not be publicized.43 This statement shows that Thailand, under the new government, used the 
																																																						
40 NL-HaNA, Gezantschap Thailand, 2.05.246, inv.nr. 350, Piets to DIRVO, 18 October 1947, 
1296/0.201.22/72. 
41 Christ Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, A History of Thailand (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009): 142. 
42 Bajunid, “Indonesian Independence League”,: 122; and Coast, Recruit to Revolution: 59. 
43 NL-HaNA, Gezantschap Thailand, 2.05.246, inv.nr. 350, Piets to Ministerie van Buitenlandse 
Zaken (Ministry of Foreign Affairs - MinBuza), 29 November 1947, 1966/0.201.211/154. 
  
18 
UN as an excuse to stay silent on the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. It had its own affairs to deal 
with. 
 However, the American advisor Patton shared his opinion with Piets that Thailand 
would be in a difficult situation after the new government had been recognized by other 
countries. In such case, it would be difficult for Thailand to negate the requests from the 
Republic. By contrast, Piets replied to Patton that the relations between Thailand and Indonesia 
were so insignificant that Thailand did not have any obligation to grant Indonesia recognition. 
If Thailand acted otherwise, it would be considered an unfriendly move towards the 
Netherlands and other states of the soon-to-be-founded United States of Indonesia.44 It is not 
known exactly how people in the Khuang government thought of the Republic in late 1947. 
 Piets’s reply to Patton was actually a direct instruction from the Dutch Foreign Office. 
On November 8, Piets received a telegram which instructed him to explain to the Thai 
government the political status of the Republic. He was also instructed to persuade the Thai 
government to leave Indonesian issues to the UN. Above all he should highlight the fact that 
the Dutch government would be affronted if Thailand were to recognize the Republic.45 These 
instructions clearly show the Dutch attempt to break the Thai-Indonesian relations. 
 In December 1947, the issue of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia was 
again put under negotiation. This was a result of an ongoing dispute which had started since 
the Police Action in July. The intense political situation between the two parties was not 
resolved even after their acceptance of the UN Security Council’s cease-fire order. The UN, 
therefore, created a new mediator for the negotiations called the Committee of Good Offices. 
This committee arranged its first meeting on December 8 on an American troopship, Renville, 
which was anchored outside Jakarta. The Netherlands and the Republic eventually signed the 
Renville Agreement on January 17, 1948. This agreement allowed the Dutch to occupy the 
areas that they had seized from the Republicans during the Police Action. However, this 
agreement also promised that sovereignty would be transferred to the future United States of 
Indonesia within one year. Should the Dutch fail to do so, the committee assured Amir 
Sjarifuddin, the new prime minister of the Indonesian Republic, that the US would help by 
pressuring the Dutch.46  
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1.2 The Strict Neutrality: Thai-Indonesian Relations in 1948 
  
Over the course of 1948, Indonesian activists in Bangkok were joined by John Coast, a Briton 
who strongly sympathized with the Indonesian struggle for independence. He would become 
an important figure in Indonesian affairs in Thailand from mid-1948 until Indonesia received 
its sovereignty in 1949.  
 It should be noted that this thesis relies heavily on information from Coast’s memoir 
because he was one of the few Republicans who worked in Thailand and recorded what he did 
during the revolution. As a result, some information in his memoir cannot be crosschecked 
with other sources. Coast might have exaggerated in his work, but the significance of his 
contribution to the Indonesian Revolution is uncontested. Given that there is a whole file of his 
activities in the archive of the Dutch legation in Bangkok, Coast must have played an important 
role. Evidence from the Dutch archives also indicates his proximity with Thai politicians.: 
“[T]hat Coast has a lot of Thai friends, some of whom were close to Phibun, is beyond doubt.”47 
Moreover, Darusman, a former staff member of the Indonesia Office in Singapore, later praised 
Coast’s contribution, saying: “The Englishman’s decision … to join Indonesia’s fight for 
independence was probably a loss to the British Foreign Service, but certainly a gain for 
Indonesia.”48 
 Coast’s passion for Indonesia began during WWII when he was a prisoner of war forced 
to work on the Siam-Burma railway. At the camp where he was interned, he met with several 
Dutchmen, Eurasians and Indonesians, and soon fell in love with Indonesian culture, especially 
traditional dances and music.49 After the war he went back to London but was still passionate 
about Indonesia. Hoping that he would soon be deployed to the archipelago, he joined the 
Foreign Office to work in the Indonesian Information Section in September 1946.50 One day 
he was informed that there was a position for secondary secretary at the British Embassy in 
Bangkok. Without hesitation, Coast decided to serve the Foreign Service in Thailand. In his 
view, working in Thailand would bring him closer to Jakarta than sitting in London.51 After 
having met several Indonesian activists in Bangkok, Coast decided to resign from the British 
Foreign Service. While waiting for approval, he often visited Phibun, the ex-prime minister of 
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Thailand during WWII, to develop a personal relationship which he thought would be valuable 
for the Indonesian cause. Coast eventually left the embassy on March 31, 1948, and moved 
into the house of Ishak Mahdi in Bangrak district. At this point, he said: “I was turning from 
an armchair pro-Indonesian into a protagonist in a sphere of action where I might well be swept 
off my balance in the tide of Indonesian nationalism.”52   
 His background in a diplomatic career may have enabled him to get into contact with 
various groups of the Thai elites. The Republicans might have been able to contact Pridi via 
the connection of Chaem Phromyong, a Muslim who was a close colleague of Pridi; however, 
Pridi was ousted and the Indonesians probably did not have another channel to approach other 
rings of the Thai elites without the help from Coast.  
 In April, Sudarsono decided to send Coast to meet Utoyo, the head of Indonesian 
representatives in Singapore. There he would receive further orders. Meanwhile, on April 6, 
there was once again a putsch in Bangkok. The same military group that had seized power in 
1947 replaced Khuang with Phibun. The field marshal, thus, ascended to his second 
premiership after having stayed low-profile for a couple of years after the war. Coast did not 
fail to use the opportunity to strengthen his relationship with Phibun. Just before his departure 
to Singapore, he went to congratulate the new prime minister of Thailand.53  
  Back in Thailand, John Coast and Ishak Mahdi called on Phibun on June 10. During 
the meeting, they highlighted the proximity of Thai and Indonesian cultures, which share 
several Indian roots, and said to Phibun that any friendly act during the revolution would 
always be remembered by Indonesia. When asked what exactly the Indonesians wanted, Coast 
replied that they wanted a permission to open up an air route between Thailand and Indonesia. 
He also mentioned that Hatta understood the difficult position of Thailand in the Dutch-
Indonesian conflict. He said: “[Hatta] … realized that an independent country like Siam which 
has long had diplomatic relations with colonial powers such as Holland, France, and my own 
country, would be politically embarrassed if asked to give diplomatic recognition to Indonesia 
now”.54 This statement probably meant that the Indonesians, in mid-1948, had already 
abandoned their hope of gaining official recognition from Thailand. Instead their aim had 
shifted to obtaining unofficial support from Thailand. 
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 Sometime between June and August 1948, Coast was appointed as official advisor of 
the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.55 During this period he produced reports about the 
political situation and future possibilities for the Republic in Thailand. These reports were 
found in Yogyakarta after the Dutch military occupied the city in 1949. They give us 
information on the strategies Coast used to approach and convince Thai officials. Moreover, 
they give information about relationships between Coast and several important personalities in 
the Thai political scene, as well as their attitude towards the Republic. Last but not least, they 
actually confirm the idea that, from mid-1948, Indonesian activists in Thailand were no longer 
concerned with the official recognition of the Republic by Thailand.  
 In his analysis of Thai politics after WWII, Coast stated that there were three different 
political groups on the scene. The first group was the military, which was the present 
government during the Indonesian revolution. The leader of this group was Phibun. The second 
group was the Democrat Party. This group was under the leadership of Khuang. The last group 
was that of Pridi and his followers. This group never came back to power but many of Pridi’s 
followers were still in civil service under Phibun’s regime. Nowadays scholars who study Thai 
politics generally agree with this structure.56 
 With this picture in mind, Coast developed different strategies to appeal to each group. 
For the military, Coast understood that their major concern was to avoid anything that would 
ruin the friendship between Thailand and the Anglo-Americans. At the same time, Coast was 
confident that whether Thailand was to help Indonesia or not was not the concern of the US 
and the UK as long as it did not affect them. However, the American and the British 
ambassadors would simply not help Indonesia by conveying their views towards this issue to 
Phibun. Although Patton had sympathy for the Indonesians, he would not help either. The 
remaining possibility was, therefore, to approach Phibun directly and persuade him that helping 
Indonesia would not ruin the friendship between Thailand and the Anglo-Americans.57 
 According to Konthi, the director general of the Western Politics Department, the 
Anglo-Americans were, in the beginning, not satisfied with the return of Phibun to Thai 
politics. They surely had not forgotten what Phibun had done during WWII. Because of this 
reputation with the Anglo-Americans, Phibun tried to please them by adopting a pro-western 
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policy. He even compromised with the French who had border conflicts with Thailand after 
the war.58  
 Coast thought that Phibun and his military clique were snobbish so he appealed to this 
group by praising Thailand. He advanced the argument that Thailand, as the only country in 
Southeast Asia that had not been not colonized by Western powers, should lead other nations 
in the region to independence as well. He also stimulated the business instincts of the Thais. 
He argued that the Netherlands would soon give Indonesia its independence. Thailand, 
therefore, only had to give her hand for minor issues and for a short period. In return, Thailand 
would benefit economically from Indonesia’s internal market of 70 million and its rich natural 
resources.59 
 The aforementioned meeting on June 10, 1948, between Phibun and Coast confirmed 
that Coast pursued his strategies accordingly with Thai elites. However, this does not mean 
that he managed to successfully influence the Thai government to grant whatever the 
Indonesians wanted. Although Phibun seemed to be convinced by Coast, another important 
person directly involved in foreign affairs was not. In his report, Coast stated that Prince 
Priditheppong Devakul, the minister of foreign affairs: “is a Rightist, Germany educated, ex-
Army officer, who used to brag about his Cadetship friend, Hermann Göring. This man is 
ignorant, conceited, and a bully.”60 This indicates that the prince must have been opposed to 
Coast. 
 To appeal to the Democrat Party, Coast highlighted the non-communistic character of 
the Republic of Indonesia. He befriended the three leaders of this group. One of them was 
Khuang Aphaiwong and the other two were the Pramoj brothers: Seni and Kukrit. For Pridi’s 
group, finally, no special tactics were needed. Some followers of Pridi, who were still in civil 
service or in the Thai government, were helping Indonesian activists in various ways. For 
example, Konthi Suphamongkhon, the director general of the Western Politics department, was 
helping with aviation issues, while Phairoj Jayanama, the director general of protocol, was 
helping with immigration issues.61 
 In mid-1948, the Thai government was not only approached by the Republicans but 
also by the Dutch representative. On July 1, J. Polderman, the Dutch charge d’affaires, called 
on Prince Priditheppong. He explained the situation of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict and tried 
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to persuade the official that Thailand should not recognize the Republican government. He 
referred to the Renville Agreement that sovereignty over the archipelago would lie completely 
with the Netherlands until the United States of Indonesia came into existence and that the 
Anglo-Americans also agreed on this. Furthermore, he argued that the Republic was influenced 
by communism and controlled just a small part of the archipelago. People outside Java actually 
did not want to live under a Javanese authority, although they might well sympathize with the 
struggle of the Republicans.62 
 After the meeting, Polderman reported the Thai’s stance to the Far East Department. 
He said that the Thai government would not take any step that could jeopardize the friendship 
between Thailand and the Netherlands. Nor would they undertake anything ahead of the UNSC 
in the Indonesian-Dutch conflict. Moreover, he reported that the Indonesian-Dutch conflict was 
not significant for the Thai government. The Thai government was more concerned with an 
important internal affair, namely, the return of the corpse of Prince Paribatra to Thailand. The 
Thai government prioritized this mission highly, because it could help raise support from Thai 
people who were generally still loyal to the royal family. To complete this mission, the Thai 
government needed cooperation from the Netherlands as the corpse was in Bandung, a city in 
west Java.63 This report indicates that Thailand would not cause discomfort to the Dutch in 
regard to the Dutch-Indonesian conflict because it required Dutch help.  
 In 1948, there was another development in the Dutch-Indonesians conflict and the 
position of Thailand regarding the conflict can be seen in the event. In June, the Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), one of the UN bodies that focused on 
economic development, held its third session in India. At this meeting the Indian delegation 
submitted an application to admit the Republic of Indonesia as associate member of the 
commission. The Dutch delegation also did the same for the Netherlands East Indies.64   
 At this occasion, Thailand indicated its standpoint in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. On 
June 9, the Thai delegation gave a statement before the commission regarding the applications 
of the Republic and the Netherlands Indies. In this statement, it can be seen that Thailand tried 
exhaustively to balance its standpoint and stay neutral. The Thai delegation started the 
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statement by saying that “facts in the Indonesian question are not quite well known to us.” The 
rest of the statement was rather convoluted.65  
 On the one hand, the Thai delegation seemed to adopt the view that the Republic was 
de facto exercising authority over its territory. On the other hand, it also acknowledged that the 
Renville Agreement limited the Republic’s foreign affairs. However, the Thai delegation then 
indicated that the Thai government “has never been made officially cognizant” of the 
aforementioned agreement. Moreover, the Thai government held the view that the agreement 
only aimed to stop atrocities in Indonesia and did not identify the political status of the disputed 
parties. Then again, the Thai delegation insisted that it was not inclined to “believe that by 
admitting the Indonesian Republic to be a party to the Renville Agreement, the political status 
of the Republic may be considered thereby as recognized.”66 
 From the statement, it is obvious that Thailand tried to stay silent and neutral. The 
statement goes back and forth between supporting and not supporting the Republic. Eventually, 
the Thai delegation, claiming that it was instructed to follow the spirit and charters of the UN, 
excused itself from casting a vote.67 
 After a long discussion, the commission could not identify the political status of the 
Republic and thus could not make a decision on the question of membership. The consideration 
of two applications was therefore postponed to the next session. Meanwhile, the commission 
hoped the UNSC would make the status of the Republic clear.68   
 After the meeting, it was evident that the Dutch were pleased with the statement of the 
Thai delegation. On June 11, a letter was sent from the Dutch legation in Bangkok to the Thai 
foreign minister. In the letter, the Dutch legation expressed its appreciation for “the 
understanding shown by the Siamese delegate at the ECAFE-Conference for the Netherlands 
standpoint.”69 
  The statement of the Thai delegation shows that Thailand tried to avoid taking sides in 
the conflict. This neutral stance, however, supported the status quo that acknowledged Dutch 
sovereignty over Indonesia. In terms of diplomacy, Thailand therefore implicitly took the 
Dutch side. One may interpret further that Thailand saw its relations with the Netherlands as 
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being more important than those with the Republic. This was understandable because the Thai 
government in mid-1948 was expecting cooperation from the Dutch in bringing back the Thai 
prince’s corpse, as mentioned earlier.  
 In this light, it was crucial for the Indonesian activists to strengthen the Indonesian-
Thai relations in order to obtain future supports from Thailand. In August 1948, Coast and 
Mahdi came up with the idea to bring some Thai elites on a visit to the Republic. Four people 
were invited as guests of the Republican government: Kukrit Pramoj, Prapasee Sirivorasarn, 
Malee Panthumachinda, and Jim Thompson.70  
 Kukrit was one of the leading members of the Democrat Party and a parliament 
member. He was also the one who Coast claimed was his friend. Prapasee and Malee were 
journalists of Nakornsarn newspaper, which was a mouthpiece of Phibun’s regime. 
Considering that the Dutch consul in Singapore called Prapasee a privé-secretaresse of Phibun 
and that Coast said she was the one who introduced him to Phibun in June 1947, she must have 
been very close to the Thai prime minister. The last person, Jim Thompson, was an American 
businessman.71 
 The trip to Yogyakarta took place between August 29 and 31. The company was 
introduced to Sukarno and Hatta. Coast himself did not record in his memoir what was 
discussed during the trip. However, the Dutch were informed that the aim of this visit was to 
discuss a secret trade agreement between the Thai and the Republican government.72  
 What the Dutch had been informed might be true, provided that Prapasee was close to 
Phibun. She might have been a messenger on his behalf. Prapasee could be a good choice for 
a representative to discuss anything in Yogyakarta without making any formal promises, since 
she was a journalist who held no position in the government. Moreover, trades between the 
Thai and the Republican government started in earnest after September 1948. More 
information on trades will be given in the next chapter.  
 If Prapasee was a representative of Phibun, it would make sense to invite her to the 
Republic. The question remains why Coast invited Kukrit. In my opinion, Coast may have had 
in mind that the Democrats could be back in power at any time. Should that happen, the 
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relationship between Kukrit and leaders of the Republic, which was to be formed during the 
trip to Yogyakarta, would benefit the Republic.  
 If Coast expected to impress the Thai elite, his effort was successful. This can be seen 
from a talk that Kukrit gave after the trip. Bangkok Post, one of Thailand’s English language 
newspapers, reported this talk on September 20, 1948. According to the news, it seems that 
Kukrit had a very good impression of the Republic of Indonesia, its leaders, as well as its 
people.73 
 The second half of 1948 saw further progress for the Republican activists in Thailand 
in the establishment of an Indonesia Office in Bangkok. A set of Indonesia Offices were 
founded after the Linggajati Agreement had been ratified in March 1947. The first of this set 
was the office in Singapore. It was considered the first official establishment of the Republic 
on foreign soil. Unlike individual Indonesian representatives that were dispatched before 1947, 
Indonesia Offices had wider objectives. They did not only represent the government but also 
aimed to develop trade relations, present the Republican version of the conflict to the media, 
and provide guidance to the local Indonesian community.74 
 In Thailand, it is not known exactly when the Indonesia Office officially opened. At 
the least, such an office had actually been prepared for operation since June or July 1948. In a 
report that Coast made for the Republican government in July, he mentioned the plan to open 
a political office in Bangkok by registering at either the ministry of Interior or the police 
department. In his memoir, a similar story was told. He wrote: “through friends in the police 
we were allowed to register Ishak’s house as the office of the Republic of Indonesia.”75  
 In September, Mahdi was interviewed by a journalist from Liberty. He said the 
Republican government appointed him deputy representative and entrusted him with the duty 
“to make arrangements for the future Indonesia Office in Bangkok.”76 Therefore, the Indonesia 
Office in Bangkok must have been opened after September. The timing is interesting because 
the prince’s corpse was transported to Thailand in September. The Thai government may have 
thought that it could make a little concession for the Republic after the transportation had been 
achieved.  
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 The existence of an Indonesia Office in Bangkok, however, did not mean that Thailand 
was about to establish an official diplomatic relation with the Republic. John Coast knew that 
Thailand would not allow the Republicans to register the Indonesia Office as a consulate or 
embassy. In his report, he wrote: “to open a political office in Bangkok the application to do 
so would probably get held up indefinitely somewhere between the Ministry of the Interior and 
the Police Department: for the results of such an office’s opening might cause embarrassment 
to the Siamese from the Dutch.”77  
 Evidence from Dutch documents in late 1948 also shares the idea that Thailand was not 
going to develop official diplomatic relation with the Republic. On November 10, C.W.A. 
Schürmann, the Dutch envoy, sent a report on the relations between Thailand and the Republic 
to the Dutch government. The report states that Thailand had a long tradition of being neutral 
in world politics. It says that the Thai government wanted to maintain friendship with the 
Netherlands so it would not deny the Netherlands’ sovereignty over the archipelago. Thereby, 
it would not recognize the Republican government. Nevertheless, the Thai government, 
thinking of its future benefits, still wanted to be friendly towards the Republic so it agreed to 
trade with the Republican government.78 
 Considering the report that was made by the Dutch legation and the fact that the 
Republicans could open Indonesia Office in Bangkok, one may describe the stance of Thailand 
in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict as opportunistic neutrality. On the one hand, the Thai 
government kept its friendship with the Netherlands because it needed the Dutch help. On the 
other hand, it did not stop the Republicans from opening an embassy-like office in the capital. 
In fact, it may have permitted the Republicans to do so suddenly after the Dutch government 
had already given the desired help. Moreover, the Thai government decided to develop trade 
relations with the Republic. These two actions show that the Thai government was aware of 
the possibility that the Republic would be Thailand's future neighbor. 
 The complicated neutral stance of Thailand can be further seen from what the Thai 
delegation did at the ECAFE meeting in December. On December 8, the commission discussed 
the applications for associate membership of the Republic and the Netherlands Indies again. 
This time the delegation from New Zealand proposed to accept both applications. While the 
delegates for Australia, Burma, China, India, Pakistan, and the Philippines supported this 
proposal, the delegates for the US and the Netherlands were against it. The Thai delegation 
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received fixed instructions regarding this issue from the Thai government. Firstly, they should 
not bring the issue before the commission. Secondly, if the issue came into discussion, they 
should avoid giving any opinion. Thirdly, they should abstain from casting a vote on this issue. 
These instructions subsequently led to the same act that the Thai delegation had done in the 
last session in June. They abstained from the vote in order to stay neutral.79 
 Towards the end of 1948, it is fair to conclude that the Republic could not make much 
progress in wooing Thailand. The Indonesian activists had made some minor steps towards 
opening lines of communication with Thai elites and the Thai government, but so far they 
remained unable to persuade the Thai government to take the Republican side in the Dutch-
Indonesian conflict.  
  
1.3 The Opportunist: Thai-Indonesian Relations in 1949 
	
Since the Renville Agreement had been signed in early 1948 by the Netherlands and the 
Republic of Indonesia, negotiations between the two parties regarding the projected United 
States of Indonesia continued throughout the year. However, the negotiations came to a 
deadlock in December 1948.  
 On December 11, the Dutch government issued an ultimatum, offering the Republic 
two alternatives to choose from in order to force the Republic into resuming negotiations. The 
first option was that the Republic must liquidate its national army and subject all of the 
remaining armed forces under the Dutch command during the interim period. The second 
alternative was actually to reject the aforementioned option. Should the Republic choose this 
second alternative, the Dutch promised that the results would be “hardships and sufferings for 
the Indonesian people.”80 
 Two days later, Hatta, then prime minister of the Republic, wrote a letter to the Dutch 
requesting a resumption of negotiations. In his letter, Hatta gave attractive concessions. For 
example, he agreed to acknowledge Dutch sovereignty over the whole of Indonesia during the 
interim period. Hitherto, this generous concession had never been thinkable by the Republican 
leaders as it could make them lose support from fellow Indonesians.81 
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 Yet, the concessions did not please the Dutch. On December 14, the Dutch made 
another proposal asking the Republic to let the Dutch government design the structure of future 
federal Indonesian states. Moreover, they requested absolute control over the appointment and 
discharge of Indonesian leadership and all armed forces in Indonesia. The answer from the 
Republic to this ultimatum was due on December 18, 1948.82 
 The deadline expired without any response from the Republican government. In the 
afternoon of the same day, D. Stikker, the Dutch foreign minister, informed the diplomatic 
representatives of the UK, France, Belgium, Canada, and the US that the Dutch government 
would proceed with necessary measures to restore peace and security in the archipelago. To 
the American diplomat alone, Stikker said the Dutch army would invade Yogyakarta within a 
matter of hours.83 
 The Dutch government launched its Second Police Action on December 19. On that 
day, Sukarno, the president of the Republic, was about to leave Yogyakarta for his meeting 
with Nehru in India. His plane was delayed in Singapore because the Dutch did not give 
clearance for flying to Indonesia. Sukarno was then captured together with Hatta and Agus 
Salim, the Indonesian foreign minister. In Jakarta, Sjahrir was also captured. These Republican 
leaders were then taken to Bangka, an island east of Sumatra. Finally, the Dutch army could 
easily occupy most Republican territories including the capital, Yogyakarta.84 
 Even though the Netherlands saw its second military offensive as a victory, other 
countries did not share this view. Several Western nations expressed their disapproval of the 
Police Action, including the US. The UNSC also announced its resolution on December 24, 
requesting the Dutch to cease hostilities and immediately release the Republican leaders and 
other political prisoners. Four days later, the UNSC, not having received any reply from the 
Dutch, issued another resolution to repeat its demands.85 
 Meanwhile in Thailand, Indonesian activists were also seeking support from the Thai 
government. John Coast and Ishak Mahdi visited several Thai leaders including Phibun, the 
prime minister, Phot Sarasin, the deputy foreign minister, and Sukich Nimmanhaemin, the 
assistant minister of education.86  
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 On December 22, Thai Mai, a Thai language newspaper, reported that Coast and Mahdi 
had called on Liang Chaiyakarn, the deputy interior minister. According to the news, Coast 
asked for sympathy and assistance from the Thai government as the Republic was facing a 
severe crisis. To persuade the Thai minister, Coast highlighted the willingness to help 
Indonesia expressed by the US, the UK, the USSR, and India. Liang, however, did not assure 
them that Thailand would support the Republic in this matter. In his reply, he said that Thailand, 
as a small country, had to “move with wariness in this matter.” Nevertheless, he promised to 
bring the matter into the cabinet meeting.87 
 Sometime between late December 1948 and early January 1949, Thakin Nu, the prime 
minister of Myanmar, suggested to Nehru that he should organize a forum to support Indonesia. 
Nehru consequently invited nineteen countries to join the conference in Delhi. These countries 
were Afghanistan, Australia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Nepal, New Zealand, Thailand, and 
Turkey (which declined to join).88  
 What is interesting regarding the relations between Thailand and Indonesia was the 
manner in which Thailand responded to this invitation. On January 4, 1949, Schürmann, the 
Dutch diplomat, reported on his meeting with Prince Priditheppong, the Thai foreign minister. 
He said that Thailand, despite being sympathetic to the Republic, would reject the invitation 
from Nehru. According to Schürmann, keeping the friendship that had long been established 
with the Netherlands was more important to Thailand than supporting the Republic 
diplomatically.89 
 Four days later, Thailand turned down the invitation by replying that the Thai 
government would wait for resolutions from the UNSC and would act accordingly. Thanks to 
Phibun and Prince Priditheppong, as Schürmann reported, the idea of sending Thai 
representatives to attend the conference in India was rejected, although some young officials 
recommended that Thailand should send a delegation to Delhi.90 
 This decision of the Thai government is understandable because the Dutch government 
had just extended its kindness to Thailand. Firstly, the Dutch government helped the Thai 
government in September 1948 in bringing back the corpse of Prince Paribatra. Secondly, the 
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Dutch government had recently invited a Thai working group on economic affairs to visit the 
Netherlands. According to the Dutch diplomat, Prince Priditheppong was highly grateful for 
this invitation, so much so that he published a communiqué in the Thai media regarding his 
upcoming visit to the Netherlands.91 
 Moreover, Phibun and Priditheppong were unhappy with India’s attempt to become the 
dominant force in Asia. They were of the opinion that India’s attempt to influence Southeast 
Asia was a threat to Thailand. They also thought that Thailand, as a country with a long history 
of being independent, should not let India take the lead. In their view, India was a newly 
independent country which was inexperienced even in governing itself.92 From their opinions, 
it may be inferred that both these Thai leaders would feel embarrassed if they were to send a 
delegation to attend a conference arranged by India. Moreover, these opinions show that 
Phibun and Priditheppong tended to avoid involvement in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. Not 
only because they wanted to please the Dutch, but they also did not share the spirit of fighting 
against colonialism in general. 
 The Republicans in Bangkok were obviously resentful. Coast reflected on this move of 
Thailand: “the Siamese Government, fantastically led by its Foreign Minister in the matter, 
was embarrassing us intensely by being so far the only one in Asia to refuse to send any 
representative to the Inter-Asian Conference…”93 Yet, the Dutch diplomat was content with 
the act of the Thai government. To express the Netherlands’ gratitude for Thailand being 
helpful regarding the Dutch-Indonesian conflict, Schürmann suggested The Hague prepare as 
grand as possible a reception for the Thai working group when they were to arrive in the 
Netherlands.94 
 The Netherlands’ gratitude, however, did not last long. On January 18, a telegram was 
sent to The Hague saying the Thai government had changed its mind. Thailand decided to send 
Thanat Khoman, a Thai representative in India, to attend the conference as an observer.95 
 During a private meeting, Prince Priditheppong told Schürmann that he personally 
found it a shame but could not do otherwise because of the pressure from various sides. Several 
newspapers criticized the government’s negligence of the problem of colonialism which other 
Asian countries were facing. They also had remarked that the government tended to take the 
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Dutch side in the conflict because of recent help from the latter. Moreover, a parliament 
member from the area where the majority population was Malay also tried to bring the 
Indonesian question into the parliament’s discussion. Lastly, the Democrat Party, after having 
a talk among themselves regarding the Indonesian question, was of the opinion that the 
government should send an observer to attend the conference in India.96  
 Before their conversation ended, Priditheppong told Schürmann that the Thai observer 
was strictly instructed to be neutral and he hoped the Dutch government would understand the 
difficulties that the Thai government was encountering.97 From the new decision and what the 
prince said, it can be concluded that the Thai government wanted to refrain diplomatically from 
the Dutch-Indonesian conflict by not attending the conference in Delhi. Although it was forced 
to change its decision, the Thai government still took the safest way. It only sent an observer 
who was instructed to avoid sharing opinions on the Indonesian question to the conference
 The conference in New Delhi took place between January 20-23, 1949. The resolutions 
were then sent to the UNSC. They requested the Dutch to release the Republican leaders and 
other political prisoners immediately, to restore the Republican government in Yogyakarta, to 
withdraw troops from the Republican areas, to remove restrictions of trades, and to form an 
interim government by March 15, 1949. In addition, the actual date to transfer sovereignty to 
the United States of Indonesia was set at January 1, 1950.98 
 On January 28, the UNSC announced similar resolutions and asked the disputing parties 
to resume negotiations. The effort to bring the Dutch into dialogues with the Indonesians was 
eventually successful on April 14. The disputing parties reached an agreement called the Van 
Roijen-Rum Statements on May 7. However, the hostile situation in the archipelago was not 
settled. Guerrilla warfare was still going on between the Dutch and the Republican army. It 
was not until June 22, that the disputed parties made a consensus to ceasefire in Yogyakarta 
under the auspices of the UN Commission for Indonesia (UNCI), a successor body of the 
Committee of Good Offices. At this point, the Dutch promised to withdraw troops from 
Yogyakarta on June 24 and to convene the Round Table Conference by 1 August 1949. This 
conference was meant to be the final discussion concerning the transfer of sovereignty to the 
United States of Indonesia.99 
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 Meanwhile in the first week of June, A.A. Maramis, the Republican foreign minister, 
had a stopover in Bangkok en route to Jakarta. The Indonesian activists brought him to see 
Phibun and the Thai minister of finance, Prince Viwat. The meetings with both Thai politicians 
were not official. Prince Viwat said he could not receive Maramis formally as Thailand had 
not yet recognized the Republican government. In any case, according to John Coast, these 
informal meetings were smooth and friendly.100  
 The Dutch legation in Bangkok was interested in these meetings of Maramis. It is 
obvious from Schürmann’s letter to the Dutch foreign office that he was following the situation 
in Thailand closely. He visited Phibun and Prince Priditheppong. Given that Maramis came in 
the first week of June and the letter of Schürmann was dated June 14, the Dutch diplomat must 
have gone to see the Thais immediately after he found out that Maramis had visited some 
important Thai figures. Phibun told Schürmann that he had not done anything more than be a 
good listener to Maramis.101 
 In fact, according to what Prince Priditheppong told the Dutch diplomat, the visit of 
Maramis to Phibun was meaningless to the Thai government. He said: “The foundation of our 
diplomacy regarding Indonesia remains that we [Thailand] keep friendly relations with the 
Netherlands and that we will not recognize the Republic. The conversation between Maramis 
and Field Marshal Phibun means nothing and brings no changes to our attitude.” Furthermore, 
the prince said he refused to meet Coast and Maramis himself because he did not see any 
necessity in listening to problems in Indonesia from an Englishman.102 
 Considering what the prince had said earlier in January together with the description of 
him by Coast, it seems likely that what Priditheppong said to Schürmann was something the 
prince really meant. In June, war between the Dutch and the Republican army was still going 
on. The Republic might fall anytime. Moreover, the Round Table Conference had not yet 
started. Priditheppong must have thought that it was not the right time to change Thailand’s 
position. In other words, Thailand should maintain relations with the Dutch and not proceed 
any further with the Republic. Still, as Maramis’ informal meetings with Phibun and Viwat 
show, the Thai government was cautious enough not entirely to give the Indonesian the cold 
shoulder.   
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 Although the Round Table Conference was planned to begin on August 1, 1949, it was 
delayed. On that day the two parties only agreed to cease fire on August 10 in Java and August 
14 in Sumatra. The conference finally started on August 23.103  
 Meanwhile in Thailand, a cocktail party was arranged by the Indonesia Office in 
Bangkok on August 17. This event was a commemoration of the proclamation of Indonesian 
independence. Ishak Madi, the head of the Indonesia Office, together with his wife, sent 
invitations to several foreign legations in Thailand, including the Dutch one.104 The party was 
set in the most prestigious hotel in Bangkok, the Oriental Hotel. The ball room was decorated 
with Thai and Indonesian flags. Mr. and Mrs. Mahdi were present, welcoming their guests. 
According to Schürmann, there were no more than 50 guests. Among them, there were some 
high-ranking officials from the foreign service ring such as the American ambassador, the 
Chinese ambassador, and the Chinese consul general. From the British legation, there were 
only three junior officials. People from the Indian, Filipino, Vietnamese, and Burmese legation 
were also presented.105  
 From the Thai side, however, there were no signs of Phibun, the prime minister, or 
Prince Priditheppong, the foreign minister. The person with the highest rank who attended the 
party was Prince Wongsanuwat, the undersecretary of state. The rest were Konthi 
Suphamongkhon, Phairoj Jayanam, and the American advisor K. S. Patton.106  
 As a commemoration of the proclamation, this event must have been immensely 
meaningful for the Republicans. If the Thai government had planned to develop official 
relations with the Republic, Phibun and Priditheppong would have attended the party. 
However, they were not present. It may be concluded that the Thai government still maintained 
the same position in August 1949 as it had taken in June. However, it would soon change its 
position in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. 
 Without any previous sign, shocking news was reported by Liberty on September 15, 
almost a month after the commemoration. The Thai newspaper stated that the Thai government 
had granted de facto recognition to the Indonesian Republican government. However, Liberty 
made a correction on the following day. It explained that there was a misunderstanding and 
that the Thai government had in fact not recognized the Republic. Although a correction was 
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made, Schürmann did not easily let this news go. He visited Phot Sarasin, then deputy foreign 
minister, on September 17 and asked if the news contained any truth. Phot replied that the 
newspaper had merely made a mistake and that the cabinet had not yet made a decision 
regarding the recognition of the Republic, though there was a discussion on this issue. 
Schürmann, therefore, asked who brought this issue into the cabinet meeting. The Thai 
politician, however, refused to answer.107 
 The Dutch diplomat then took this opportunity to insist on the Netherlands’ standpoint. 
He said the Netherlands would not appreciate a Thai recognition of the Republic. He also 
mentioned that Prince Priditheppong had always assured him that Thailand would maintain 
friendship with the Netherlands and that Thailand would follow guidelines from the UN.108 
 Phot’s reply was rather strange considering the usual Thai attitude towards the Dutch-
Indonesian conflict. He said Thailand certainly did not want to choose a party in this conflict; 
however, the government would have to recognize the party who was supported by the majority 
population. This may be seen as a shift of position for the Thai government.109 
 Phot’s general approach to foreign policy should be noted here. In general, it seemed 
that he did not want to cause any discomfort to Thailand’s neighbors. For example, in 1950, he 
refused the idea to recognize the American-sponsored Bao Dai government of Vietnam because 
it was only meant for fighting against communism and was not really supported by the 
Vietnamese people. He was afraid that the Vietnamese communists might win the war. In that 
case, Thailand would fall into a difficult situation concerning its relations with Vietnam. Phot 
even resigned when Phibun insisted on recognizing the Vietnamese puppet government.110 This 
shows that Phot was concerned about the future relations between Thailand and its neighbors. 
Therefore, he wanted to support neighboring countries. In the case of Indonesia, the Thai 
official must have known from the presence of the American ambassador at the 
commemoration party that the US had already become moderately pro-Indonesian. Since the 
American stance in this matter suited his opinion, Phot must have thought that it was time to 
change the Thai’s position. 
 There is another interesting thing about Phot Sarasin. On September 23, A.M.L. 
Winkelman, the Dutch consul general in Singapore, sent a copy of a letter written by Ishak 
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Mahdi to the Dutch foreign office. The letter was sent to the Indian legation in Bangkok 
requesting a staff member there to send two encoded messages to Jakarta and The Hague on 
behalf of Mahdi. Both messages stated that Phot had officially expressed the Thai 
government’s readiness to recognize the Republic.111 
 One month later, Winkelman received another copy of a letter written by Mahdi. The 
Dutch consul general did not fail to forward a copy of this letter to his superiors in The Hague. 
Just like before, Mahdi requested the Indian legation to send an encoded message to 
Yogyakarta. The message said that the presidential recognition letter from the Thai government 
had not yet arrived. Mahdi, therefore, wrote in his message that a new presidential letter should 
be sent to him immediately.112  
 At this point, it was obvious that the Thai government would definitely have granted 
the Republic of Indonesia its recognition if the presidential letter had come. The sudden change 
of Thailand’s position in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict may have been caused by the change 
of Thai foreign minister from Priditheppong to Phot. Moreover, the Round Table Conference 
might have shown the promising future of the Republic. By October, H. Merle Cochran, an 
American diplomat who was the chairman of the UNCI, had brilliantly solved two major issues 
regarding the transfer of sovereignty: the future Dutch-Indonesian relation, and the debts of 
Indonesia.113 Therefore, from September onwards, the Thai government must have expected 
that Indonesia was shortly going to become independent.  
 On December 16, 1949, the US officially recognized Indonesia. Three days later, an 
official letter from the Thai foreign ministry arrived at the Indonesia Office in Bangkok. The 
letter was signed by Phot Sarasin, who had recently been promoted to minister of foreign 
affairs. It says the Thai government had already granted the Republic of Indonesia a de facto 
recognition. The Dutch legation was also informed. At this occasion, John Coast wrote: “Ishak 
and I … were also not especially interested in this formal recognition, for although the Siamese 
had indeed sometimes hindered us officially, or shown signs of almost European suspicion of 
the Republic, we had realized very fully how much practical help we had received from many 
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sections of the Siamese people.”114 It seemed the Indonesians in Bangkok were satisfied. What 
is interesting is that the Thai recognition came shortly after the Americans’, suggesting that the 
Thai government followed the Americans on this matter. 
 
1.4 Summary  
	
From the whole course of the Indonesian Revolution, it can be seen that there was a short period 
in 1947 in which Thailand was inclined to support the Republic. This period ended with a coup 
by the military. Since then Thailand officially stayed neutral until the very last episode of the 
Indonesian Revolution, in contrast to many other states in the region. It is true that Thailand 
avoided taking sides in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. Yet, it had never denied the sovereignty 
of the Dutch over Indonesia. The Thai government under Phibun maintained its relations with 
the Netherlands properly. This might have been a result of the country’s policy to appease 
former Allied powers, the need of practical helps from the Dutch government, and the 
unpredictable future of the Indonesian Republic. This stance began to change when the Round 
Table Conference was going on. About ten days before the archipelago became independent, 
Thailand gave the Republic of Indonesia de facto recognition. This clearly shows the 
opportunistic nature of the Thai government. It endorsed Indonesia when it knew that the latter 
was certain to become its neighbor. 
 What the Indonesians thought about this delayed endorsement is difficult to ascertain. 
What happened between Thailand and Indonesia during 1945-1949 is not even reported at all 
in a commemorative book of diplomatic relations between the two countries that was published 
in 2011. In fact, the book marks March 7, 1950, as the beginning of the friendship between 
Thailand and Indonesia.115 From this book, it seems that the delayed recognition of Indonesia 
by Thailand did not negatively affect the Thai-Indonesian relations in the years after 1950. 
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Chapter 2 - Unmentioned Support: Unofficial Relations between Thailand 
and the Republic of Indonesia 
 
The absence of official diplomatic relations between Thailand and the Republic during the 
Indonesian revolution did not mean that Thailand was totally uninvolved in the Dutch-
Indonesian conflict. On the contrary, several important activities of the Republicans involved 
Thailand. To gain a better picture of Thailand’s position in the conflict and to explain how 
Thailand attempted to square the circle of appeasing the Dutch while staying on friendly terms 
with the Indonesians, this chapter looks at how Thailand dealt with three major activities of the 
Republicans: the transportation of Indonesian Republicans by a Thai airline, the use of Thai 
airfields as bases in clandestine missions, and the trades between Southern Thailand and 
Sumatra. This chapter is divided into sections dealing with these three activities.  
 
2.1 Gateway to the Outside World 
	
In April 1948, John Coast flew from Bangkok to Singapore to meet Utoyo, the head of the 
Indonesia Office in Singapore. There he received his first order as an activist of the Republic 
of Indonesia. Utoyo told him that there was only one direct channel that connected the Republic 
and the outside world; that was through the Yogyakarta-Manila flight. Utoyo therefore asked 
Coast if he could arrange charter flights from Thailand to the Republic and vice versa. These 
flights were meant for transporting Indonesian Republicans who would support the Republic’s 
position on international stages. The charter flights were to be operated by Pacific Overseas 
Airlines Siam (POAS) from May 1948 until the end of December 1948. During this period, the 
Thai government was repeatedly pressured by the Dutch legation in Bangkok to prohibit POAS 
from operating flights to the Republic. Apart from a desultory warning, however, the Thai 
government did not try hard to stop POAS. The airline continued its flights to Yogyakarta until 
it was not possible to land there anymore after the Second Police Action. 
 After his meeting with Utoyo in Singapore, Coast went back to Thailand. Together with 
Ishak Mahdi, another Indonesian activist, he contacted several airlines based in Bangkok and 
found two interested companies which were both 25 percent owned by the Thai government. 
One of them was Trans Asiatic Airlines Siam (TAAS). The other company was POAS. The 
latter company’s operation manager was an American, Sim Baldwin. As it turned out, POAS’s 
offer was considerably cheaper than the offer from TAAS. Moreover, POAS’s Dakota plane 
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had an extra petrol tank which enabled it to fly further. Coast and Mahdi, thus, took the offer 
of POAS.116 
 Before the first charter flight took off, Coast and Baldwin went to consult with Utoyo 
again for the exact plan. It was then clear that the plane had to go to Singapore first to fetch 
passengers and freight before it could proceed to the Republic. According to Coast, he informed 
Phibun of this flight. In reply, Phibun merely smiled – and the plane was permitted to go.117 It 
may be speculated that Phibun thought it would be the only flight and did not really know about 
aviation formalities regarding the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. 
 The first POAS charter flight to the Republic took off from Bangkok on May 13, 1948. 
The plane was a Dakota with the registration number PC-103 and was flown by David Fowler. 
The next morning, after being loaded with passengers and freight, it took off again from 
Singapore and flew to Sumatra. In theory, foreign planes could not enter the Indonesian 
archipelago without permission from the Dutch authority because they held sovereignty over 
Indonesia. Foreign planes could only request clearance for the airports designated by the Dutch. 
The Republican airfields could not be landed on by foreign planes.118 Fowler was aware that a 
problem would arise if he were to ask for clearance for Pekanbaru, an area under the 
Republican’s control. Therefore, he decided to request clearance for Bangkok instead. It 
seemed that the air traffic control in Singapore was satisfied with all the plane’s documents. 
The plane was then allowed to fly to Bangkok. However, according to a letter by the Dutch 
consul in Singapore, the POAS Dakota PC-103 suddenly changed its destination from Thailand 
to Indonesia without any announcement.119 
 The plane finally landed in Bukit Tinggi, a west Sumatran town. After some cargo had 
been unloaded and some passengers had exited, PC-103 proceeded further to the capital of the 
Republic of Indonesia, Yogyakarta.120 In Yogyakarta, Coast and Baldwin discussed future 
plans with the Air Commodore Suryadarma. A rough draft of a contract was made by the three 
to be submitted to the vice president, Hatta. Baldwin then said he would have to consult with 
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his colleagues at POAS. While Baldwin was flying back to Thailand with the PC-103, Coast 
stayed in Yogyakarta to meet other Republican leaders.121 
 On May 25, 1948, Coast left Yogyakarta for Sumatra where he was ordered by a 
Republican colonel to ask the Thai government for landing rights in Songkhla, a southern city 
in Thailand. Due to some confusions and delays, Coast arrived back in Bangkok on June 5. 
After the business trip to the Republic, Coast and Mahdi continued their work. They went to 
see the Thai prime minister on June 10 and asked for permission to operate regular charter 
flights between Thailand and the Republic.122  
 Although Coast wrote in his memoir that “Phibun made no objections at all,” the matter 
might not have been as easy as he presented it. In a report Coast drafted for the Republican 
government, he stated that Phibun hesitated because he was afraid of Anglo-American 
reactions. However, after Coast had repeatedly assured him that the British did not intend to 
interfere in what was not their business, Phibun eventually agreed to turn a blind eye to this 
matter and left it to be dealt with on a departmental level.123 
 Consequently, Coast and Mahdi went to the Ministry of Communications to discuss the 
possibilities of establishing an air route between Thailand and the Republic. According to 
Polderman, the Dutch charge d’affaires, the Ministry of Communications forwarded the issue 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.124 Yet there is no evidence of a final decision from the Thai 
government regarding the use of Thailand as a base for charter flights to and from the Republic. 
There might have been no official decision on this matter at all. Thai officials may have 
informally and orally permitted the Indonesians to do whatever they wanted if it did not cause 
troubles to Thailand. This can be seen from Coast’s report. He wrote that the Minister of 
Communications and the head of the Civil Aviation Board were friendly to POAS and were 
willing to let the charter flights go to Indonesia.  
 In my estimation, POAS flights could not cause serious problems to the Thai 
government, if there were ever problems at all. The government held only 25 percent share in 
POAS. With such a relatively small stake, it could easily claim that POAS was a private firm 
and that the government was not liable for POAS’s problems. If no problem arose, the 
government could simply profit from the charter flights. Moreover, individual Thai 
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shareholders would profit as well. Among these people, there may have been individuals who 
could influence the government. For instance, the minister of communications’ nephew was 
also active in the company.125 In this respect, it is possible to say that POAS, through personal 
connections between its shareholders and politicians, pressured the government into permitting 
charter flights for the Indonesians. Since Phibun had already informally given a green light to 
the Indonesians, the Thai government simply let POAS operate its flights without interfering. 
 The next task for Coast and Mahdi was to request permission to land and refuel their 
charter plane at Songkhla airfield to avoid stopovers in Singapore. This airfield in Southern 
Thailand was exclusively used by the government-owned Siamese Airways. Despite some 
protest from Siamese Airways, since POAS was its rival company, future POAS charter flights 
were allowed to land and refuel in Songkhla. Coast wrote in his memoir that General Chai 
Pradipasena, the manager of Siamese Airways, finally made peace with him, yet he did not 
mention in his memoir why General Chai granted this concession.126 The reason may be 
inferred from another document also written by Coast. In his report about aviation in Thailand, 
Coast stated that General Chai was interested in providing charter flights and arms 
transportation to Indonesia. He wrote: “General Chai, to Ishak Mahdi alone, made certain 
highly mercenary and suspect offers of arms-running to Indonesia.”127 Thus, it can be 
concluded that the permission for POAS to land and refuel at the airfield in Songkhla was 
granted because General Chai wanted to keep a friendly relationship with the Indonesian 
activists for his future profits. In other words, this concession was made possible out of the 
personal interests of a Thai official. 
 The second flight was again allowed to take off from Thailand without difficulty and 
the contract between POAS and the Republican government was signed in the last week of 
June 1948. The Dutch Far East Department received a telegram from Singapore stating that 
POAS PC-103 left Singapore on June 27 with clearance for Bangkok. Again, the plane did not 
fly to the requested destination but to Yogyakarta via Songkhla. According to the contract, a 
POAS plane would fly to Yogyakarta via Bukit Tinggi every fortnight.128 
 At this point, the Dutch legation in Bangkok could not tolerate more “illegal” flights 
between Thailand and the Republic. Therefore, Polderman visited Suvabhand Bidhyakar, the 
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director general of the Division of Transport and the head of Civil Aviation Board. During their 
conversation, Suvabhand promised that an instruction regarding unscheduled flights would be 
sent to all airlines in Thailand and that unscheduled flights would have to request permission 
from the government before taking off. Suvabhand said this measure would stop future flights 
to the archipelago. The instruction was sent to all airlines as promised.129 This action was 
suspicious as it contradicts what Suvabhand had said to Coast earlier. 
 In this particular period, the Dutch legation also pressured the Thai government through 
the Thai Foreign Office. A letter was sent to Konthi Suphamongkhon, the director general of 
the Western Politics Department, on July 23. It complains that POAS flights had circumvented 
certain regulations and kindly asked the Thai authority to stop such flights.130 However, Konthi 
must have ignored the letter. He was one of the few Thais who helped the Indonesians out of a 
personal ideology. John Coast mentioned him in relation to this matter: “Konthi is entirely on 
our side and has not yet even acknowledged a technical protest about POAS…” The reason 
why Konthi helped the Republic was simple. He was against colonialism and his ideology can 
be seen clearly in his memoir: “The era of colonialism is over. It would be excellent if Thailand 
could help neighboring countries to obtain their independence. … I always proposed this idea 
when I worked at the Western Politics Department.”131 The Dutch attempt to pressure through 
him was therefore fruitless. 
 Eventually, the measures to stop POAS did not last long. There were protests from 
airlines which had interests in providing charter flights. In the case of POAS, it argued that the 
Thai government could not control it because the government was not the major shareholder.132 
Because of the pressure from airlines, Suvabhand recalled the instruction on August 11, 1948, 
and unscheduled flights resumed thereafter.133 Because of the failure to stop POAS, Polderman 
warned the Thai government that the Dutch government would take a strong measure against 
these illegal flights and would not be held responsible for any damage caused by the 
measure.134 But even though the Dutch had put such pressure on the Thai government, it 
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appears that POAS made another flight on August 29 without disruption. This time it even 
brought a notable Thai politician and two Thai journalists to the Republican capital (see chapter 
1). 
 It is hard to know what the Thais were really thinking at the time. However, some 
conclusions may be drawn from this story. At the departmental level, it can be seen that the 
Thai foreign ministry ignored protests from the Dutch because Konthi, the staff who dealt with 
aviation matters, sympathized with the Indonesians as a result of his anti-colonial ideology. 
Moreover, the Civil Aviation Board must have been in a difficult situation. It could not issue 
an instruction that would restrict all airlines from operating charter flights just because it 
wanted to stop POAS. At the governmental level, as mentioned earlier, the cabinet must have 
considered POAS a private company. Furthermore, the cabinet may have been influenced by 
politicians who had a stake in the company. Ultimately, the Thai government was probably of 
the opinion that POAS flights were not part of its responsibility. Therefore, it could ignore the 
Dutch protests on this matter. No other measure to stop POAS was introduced again. 
  The Dutch must have also noticed the nonchalance of the Thais at some point. John 
Coast once reflected on this: “[B]ut judging by the number of notes and memoranda and 
photographs that Polderman had sent to the Siamese Foreign Ministry, the Dutch in Bangkok 
had begun to realize that the Siamese were not to be easily frightened off this aid to 
Indonesia.”135 Consequently, the Dutch started to intercept POAS flights that went to 
Indonesia.  
 In the middle of September 1948, a POAS plane landed on Bukit Tinggi at dawn. There 
a Republican official informed Coast and his crew that he had sent a radio message to Jambi 
stating that the plane would arrive at ten o’clock. With surprise, Coast asked the official 
whether he had sent the message in clear. “Yes, in clear” replied the official. Coast suddenly 
knew that this official had just told the Dutch when and where to spot the plane.136 
 Nevertheless, David Fowler, the pilot, decided to fly further to Jambi. The plane landed 
safely. A few minutes later, two Dutch B-25 Mitchell Bombers came in and circled over the 
airfield. Reinforcements were sent in continuously from then until dusk to ensure that the 
charter plane could not take off. Eventually, the plane could proceed to Yogyakarta at 
midnight.137 
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 Despite warning and interception, in the POAS’s perspective, it could not stop flying 
to Indonesia. In 1948, POAS was in extreme need of funds and charter flights sponsored by 
the Republic of Indonesia were its main source of income. Since January 1948, the company 
faced a financial crisis because of mismanagement. Before January 9, Luang Rob Rukij was 
chairman of the board of directors and managing director of POAS. He was also chairman of 
the board of directors at Bangkok Bank. POAS’s bills were thus paid by the Bangkok Bank’s 
overdrafts. However, Luang Rob resigned because of disagreements with the board of 
directors. Since then POAS’s overdrafts were no longer honored by Bangkok Bank. 
Consequently, the company was short of petrol supplies and its scheduled flights ceased their 
service.138 Provided that POAS was in a serious financial situation, it is understandable that 
POAS strived to keep its highly profitable Bangkok-Yogyakarta route available. According to 
a confiscated document, the Republicans paid 500 Straits dollars for each charter contract plus 
1,000 Straits dollars per day for accommodation.139  
 The Indonesian Republicans used this service until December 1948. The last charter 
flight took off from Bangkok on December 16, 1948, and reached Yogyakarta on the following 
day. The plane left the Republican capital just one day before the Dutch launched their Second 
Police Action. After Yogyakarta fell into Dutch hands, POAS had no other choices but to cease 
their service for the Republic. It appears that POAS did not resume the service in 1949.140 
 
2.2 The Mysterious Aircrafts in Songkhla 
 
Apart from semi-official Thai charter flights, there were several aircrafts which flew 
clandestinely between the Republic and the outside world. For example, there were the 
Republic-Myanmar route and the Republic-Philippines route. These aircrafts were mostly 
piloted by former British, American, and Australian air force officers. Their service was on a 
personal commercial basis. They were commissioned by representatives of the Republican 
government for transportation of either men or freight. This thesis will only trace the aircrafts 
which came to Thailand. As appears from the sources, these aircrafts began to make flights to 
Thailand in late 1947 and stopped in the third quarter of 1948. During this period, Thailand 
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was involved in these aircrafts’ business in two ways. Firstly, Thailand was a stopover from 
where Republican activists could travel further to other destinations. Secondly, Thailand was 
a place that the Republican-commissioned aircrafts could use as a temporary base to refuel, 
and load cargo during their missions. The Thai government certainly knew that these aircrafts 
entered the country. In fact, some Thai officials were involved in allowing or supporting them 
to do so. Undoubtedly, the Dutch legation in Bangkok reported these flights to the Thai 
government several times. However, apart from promising the Dutch that they would do 
something, the Thai government did not undertake any strong measure against these flights 
throughout the period in which these flights were operating. 
 In contrast to other charter flights, which mostly dealt with the transport of people, the 
main purpose of these illegal flights seems to have been smuggling. During the Revolution, the 
Republicans needed to smuggle goods like opium and weapons in and out of the Republic. A 
question remains why the Thai government was not willing to curtail these activities even 
though they were aware of them. 
  The first flight of this kind came to Bangkok on October 10, 1947. A green two-
engined Dakota plane suddenly landed on Don Muang airfield in the north of Bangkok. Thai 
airfield officials who had not previously been informed about its arrival ran to the plane as it 
came to a standstill. Four people came out of it. One American and three Indonesians formed 
its passengers. They told Thai airfield officials that they had come from Yogyakarta to hand 
messages to the chief of staff of the Thai Royal Air Force and the director of Civil Aviation.141 
In his memoir, Coast wrote about this event that the passengers were detained by the Thai 
immigration police for a while before they were allowed to go into the city. According to Coast, 
Phya Prachit, the minister of communications, was the person who set the Indonesians free 
from immigration police.142 It was fortunate that these Indonesians had come before the Thai 
military coup on November 8, 1947 (see chapter 1). Pridi, the statesman who controlled the 
government, was more sympathetic towards the Indonesian struggle for independence than his 
successors. Had they come after the coup, the situation could have been much more 
complicated. 
 Later, it became known that this Dakota was the first registered Republican plane. Its 
registration number was RI002. The plane was piloted by Bob Freeberg, an American who had 
started to conduct illicit flights between Manila and the Republic for commercial reasons. The 
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Dakota RI002 did not fly to Thailand regularly. Its main tasks were to transport some 
lightweight cargoes like vanilla beans and cinchona barks out of the republic to generate 
revenue for the fledging government.143 
 Nevertheless, this aircraft was sometimes involved in transporting people as well. On 
June 5, 1948, RI002 made another landing in Thailand. This time it brought seven passengers 
to the Thai southern province of Songkhla. What is interesting is that the passengers proceeded 
on their journey further into Singapore. Malayan Security Service informed the Dutch consul 
that these people traveled without appropriate papers and that they could easily buy visas to 
enter Malaya. The Dutch consul general suspected that these Indonesians were involved in 
purchasing weapons for the Republic.144  
 Towards the end of 1947, there was another landing of a mysterious plane on Songkhla 
airfield. Seriphab, a Thai newspaper, reported on December 15, 1947, that a two-engined plane 
made an unexpected visit to Songkhla with eight passengers including a pilot. Apart from 
suspicious answers, the airfield officials could not get any information from its Indonesian 
passengers. The report states further that the passengers had spent a night in the city before 
they boarded the same plane and took off. The plane, however, came back in an hour and the 
passengers spent another night in Songkhla. On the following day, six of the passengers took 
a train to the Thai-Malaya border while another two flew the plane somewhere. The newspaper 
also stated that the Thai authorities were later informed that approximately 1,064 grams of gold 
had been disposed by the passengers of this mysterious plane.145 Provided that the passengers 
of this unidentified plane came to Thailand to travel further into Malaya, there is a possibility 
that this mysterious trip to Songkhla was made by Dakota RI002. 
 From these cases, it can be assumed that Thailand was used as a transit place. 
Indonesian activists could bypass difficulties that could have occurred if they had gone directly 
to Singapore without proper travel documents. It should also be noted that, at least according 
to both the news report and the letter of a Dutch diplomat, the Thai authorities in Songkhla did 
not display hostile reactions towards these flights. Wade Palmer, another pilot who used to fly 
to Thailand, once said he could land on Songkhla airfield without trouble by bribing the local 
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officials with a few American dollars.146 The Dakota RI002 might have done the same. In this 
respect, it could land on Songkhla because the local authorities were corrupt. 
 Beside Dakota RI002, there were at least two other aircrafts that often came to Thailand. 
One of them was an Avro-Anson with the registration number VH-AGK. On July 24, 1948, 
Polderman, the Dutch charge d’affaires, once reported several landings of the Avro-Anson on 
Songkhla airfield. It was piloted by Wade Palmer, an ex-pilot of the British Royal Air Force. 
According to Coast, Palmer lived in Bukit Tinggi (West-Sumatra) and mainly made internal 
flights within the archipelago.147 This may be the reason why his name rarely appears in the 
documents of the Dutch legation in Bangkok. 
 Another aircraft was a Catalina (a small seaplane) with the registration number VH-
BDP. Richard Cobley was the pilot of this plane. Cobley was a major in the British Signal 
Corps during WWII. He was demobilized in Myanmar in 1947. In February 1948, he joined a 
group of Australians and Americans who owned the Catalina. With this group, he started flying 
between the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and other places in Southeast Asia. Later, the 
Americans left but the Australians still worked with Cobley.148 
 There are many records on this Catalina VH-BDP in the archive of the Dutch legation 
in Bangkok. The reason is simple. This aircraft was involved in transporting one of the most 
important cargoes out of the archipelago. These cargoes were opium, a product which 
generated a remarkable amount of revenue for the Republic. The struggle for independence 
was an expensive project. Throughout the period between 1945 and 1949, the government of 
the Indonesian Republic was in need of money to build and maintain its military, as well as to 
support all of its activities abroad. At the beginning, crop products like rubber and sugar were 
the main source of the government’s income. However, it became more difficult to trade these 
products in 1947 because of the Dutch blockade. This pressured the Republican government to 
search for an alternative product. Opium came into its consideration for two reasons. It was 
lightweight and valuable. These two advantages meant that a small quantity of opium, which 
was easy to transport, could make a considerable amount of money for the Republic.149 
 Large amounts of opium were carried out of the Republic by speedboat. For example, 
500 kilos of raw opium were shipped to Singapore in March 1948. A.A. Maramis, the 
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Republican minister of finance, asked a young Chinese Indonesian, Tony Wen, to supervise 
this opium transaction since Wen had connections with Chinese businessmen in Singapore. 
Wen’s connection allowed the Republic to trade directly with Singapore, bypassing the 
middlemen in Jakarta and Semarang, both of which were in the Dutch-occupied territory.150  
 Later, in the middle of 1948, opium appeared to be taken out of the archipelago by 
plane. This is where Cobley and his Catalina entered the scene. Cobley and his crew were 
commissioned to transport this valuable product. Wen was still involved in the trade. In June 
1948, when Coast and Cobley met each other for the first time in a hotel in Bangkok, the latter 
said that he was working with a group of Chinese who were in touch with the Indonesians in 
East Java. It appeared later that the Indonesian colleagues in East Java were those from an 
independent Air Force and the Ministry of Finance.151 At this point, it is clear that Cobley 
worked with Wen and Maramis. 
 According to Robert Cribb, the Catalina carried opium from Lake Campurdarat in East 
Java to Singapore. Wen would wait for the plane in Singapore to deal with the opium. This 
kind of flights made by the Catalina was more elaborately reported in a letter from the Far East 
Department to the Dutch legation in Bangkok. It says that the Catalina would carry opium, 
which was wrapped in rubber sheets, from Java to a place at sea not far from Singapore. The 
opium would then be loaded onto a barge. After having transferred the opium, the Catalina 
would fly empty to Songkhla and wait for cargoes to be readied for the return flight. The return 
cargo would be loaded onto the Catalina somewhere on the sea near Singapore.152 The Dutch 
intelligence service was right. Cobley once told Coast a similar story when they met each other 
in Jambi in October 1948.153 
 However, Cobley’s Catalina did not only go to Songkhla, which it used as a temporary 
base. Cobley and his Catalina also flew to Bangkok. He landed at least three and maybe four 
times in Bangkok between June and July 1948. His first landing in Bangkok was without 
permission. On June 9, the Catalina suddenly made a water landing at Klongtoei, a district in 
central Bangkok. Cobley gave as an excuse that his plane was running out of petrol; It seemed 
that a similar excuse was also used several times when pilots who worked for the Republic 
wanted to land on Songkhla airfield. This time, the Thai authorities did not do anything with 
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Cobley and even approved a request for a landing on Songkhla airfield. According to the border 
patrol, the plane had been loaded with tires before it left Bangkok on June 14.154 For the first 
landing, it was possible that the Thai authorities allowed him to land because of the technical 
excuse. Yet, it will be shown below why he could repeatedly land in Bangkok without troubles.  
 On July 28, 1948, an unidentified document was drafted and signed by a person named 
“Cowan.” Coast mentions the name “McGowan” three times in his memoir. If this Cowan was 
the same person as McGowan, he would then be another American pilot who conducted a gun-
running business in the Philippines. This person also wrote another memorandum for the Dutch 
charge d’affaires. Both documents report similar information in connection with a flight to 
Bangkok made by Cobley. As of now, it may thus be inferred that the document dated 28 July 
1948 was also a memorandum made for Polderman.155  
 Both memoranda report a Cobley flight to Bangkok on July 28. According to these 
documents, it was Cobley’s third flight to Bangkok. Again, he landed on water at Klongtoei. 
This time, however, he landed legally with a permit requested from the Thai authorities by a 
staff of the Bangkok-based Borneo Company. It appears that the application for permission for 
landing was not arranged by Borneo Company alone. Another firm called Siameric Company 
was also involved in the matter.156 
 An application for landing made by two companies may sound ordinary. Yet, there was 
an interesting network behind this application for landing on the Thai water. Cobley and his 
crew undoubtedly made flights here and there for commercial reasons. They certainly did not 
work only for the Republic of Indonesia but for whoever hired them. In Thailand, Cobley had 
an agent, the P&M Company. This company was involved in a transaction of arms between a 
Thai party and Vietnamese nationalists in 1946.157 The manager of P&M Company was a royal 
descendant, Pongamorn Kridakorn. He was closely associated with another member of the Thai 
Royal Family, Theprit Devakul who was the manager of Siameric Company.158  
 Now it is clear that Cobley was able to land legally in Bangkok because of a blessing 
from these two members of the Thai elite. It is not known exactly what interests Pongamorn 
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and Theprit had with Cobley. However, it appears that every time before leaving Bangkok, 
Cobley would load his Catalina with heavy duty tires.159 It may be assumed here that P&M 
Company and Siameric Company were probably involved in shipping goods into or out of the 
Republic. 
  Cobley’s network was not limited to these two companies. He also had a connection 
with Siamese Airways which may have enabled him to land on Songkhla airfield without 
troubles. In that time, only flights of Siamese Airways and Royal Thai Air Force could use that 
airfield. Siamese Airways was mainly owned by the Thai government, but there were also 
individual Thai shareholders. Two of the shareholders were import-export firms associated 
with Prince Rangsiyakorn Apakorn. In 1948, Prince Rangsiyakorn was an acting minister of 
defense and held a rank of group captain in the Royal Thai Air Force. What is more interesting 
regarding the network of Cobley was that the prince was a brother-in-law of Pongamorn, the 
manager of P&M Company.160 It was plausible that Pongamorn may have utilised his personal 
connection with Rangsiyakorn to enable Cobley’s Catalina to land on Songkhla airfield several 
times without disruption from the airfield authority. So far it may be concluded that Cobley 
could use Thailand as base because some Thai elites were involved in the business and misused 
their authority for their own personal gain. 
 Cobley’s flights certainly annoyed the Dutch legation in Bangkok. In fact, when 
Polderman went to see the director general of the Thai Division of Transport and the head of 
Civil Aviation Board, it was also because of this matter (see 2.1). However, it seems that the 
Thai authority did not do anything with flights such as Cobley’s during the period between 
June and September 1948. The question is why the Thai government did not do anything.  
 Beside the problem of corruption some other reasons can be drawn from the concerns 
expressed by two Dutch diplomats in Bangkok. Schürmann said Songkhla was very far from 
Bangkok and therefore was difficult to control by the central authority. In fact, there were no 
staff of the Civil Aviation Board in Songkhla at all.161 What Schürmann said basically reflects 
the state’s incapability to enforce law and order in the South. Yet, the Thai government might 
still have done nothing even if it had had the ability to control the southern provinces 
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completely. According to Polderman, the Thai government in 1948 was facing a Muslim 
insurgent group in the South. Therefore, it did not want to worsen the situation by taking strong 
measures against the Indonesians.162   
 After several complaints from the Dutch, the Thai authority began to make a move. But 
the move seemed disingenuous and came too late. The earliest action from the Thai government 
came in October 1948. Schürmann wrote a letter to The Hague saying that the Thai authority 
in the southern provinces promised to chain any plane that came into their areas illegally. He 
also mentioned that the Thai Civil Aviation Board would ground Cobley’s Catalina should it 
come to Thailand again.163 This promise could be seen as merely symbolic because no staff of 
the Civil Aviation Board were working at the Songkhla airfield. It may be concluded that the 
Board only wanted to assuage the Dutch without having any real intention to address their 
concerns. 
 In any case, it seems that Cobley made his last flight to Songkhla in September 1948. 
Kiattisakdi, a Thai language newspaper, made a report of this flight. It says an unidentified 
aircraft landed on Songkhla Lake on September 13.164 In October 1948, Cobley’s Catalina was 
in Jambi (Sumatra) waiting for spare parts. Coast met him once and told him that the authority 
in Singapore knew about the smuggling of opium into the island. In reply, Cobley said: “Then 
I’ve got to stick it out in Indonesia until this blows over, because from what you say it’s not 
safe for me to land again in Singapore, Siam is doubtful, while Rangoon and Australia are 
obviously out of the question.”165 As there are no further reports about Cobley’s flights, it may 
be concluded from what he said above that he stayed low-profile in Jambi until he died on 
December 29, 1948, during the Second Police Action.166  
 Bob Freeberg, another pilot who worked for the Republic, had already disappeared in 
October 1948. Cobley was the last pilot who flew between Thailand and the Republic of 
Indonesia, his death thus marking the end of these clandestine flights. 
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2.3 Trades between Thailand and the Republic of Indonesia  
 
The Indonesians’ need for money and strategic materials during the war of Independence led 
to trades between the Republic and other countries not only through clandestine flights but also 
by other means. Although Singapore was its main partner in trades – or in what the Dutch 
called “smuggling” – with the Republic because of its networks of Chinese merchants,167 the 
Republic also traded with other countries such as Myanmar, India, the Philippines, and 
Thailand. As can be found in historical sources, trades between Thailand and the Republic of 
Indonesia started in the last quarter of 1946 and lasted until November 1949. During this period, 
the Republic exported several products to Thailand. Most important were the trades of raw 
rubber. Other important products were sugar and petrol, as well as opium.   
 By selling these products, Republican agents were able to collect money for the 
acquisition of necessary materials. Yet, in some cases, the Republic bartered goods with 
Thailand instead of using hard cash. In turn, Thai traders exported weapons, American goods, 
and rice to the Republic of Indonesia. Several Thais and Westerners residing in Thailand were 
involved in these trades. In general, trades were done by individuals or private companies. 
However, there was at least one case in which the Thai government itself was the trader.  
 Among all the necessary materials during the Indonesian Revolution, weapons were 
probably the most important thing for the fledging Republican government. It is shown in a 
work by H. Bing Siong that the Republicans started out their revolution with an advantageous 
position regarding the number of arms at their disposal. The first stocks of arms were obtained 
from the Japanese troops in the archipelago which capitulated in August 1945. As time passed, 
however, more arms were needed because the Dutch captured arms and military equipment 
from the Republicans. The Republicans were thus forced to acquire arms from outside.168 
 After WWII, Thailand had a large over-supply of arms. These stocks came mainly from 
two sources: the Japanese troops, and arms supplies from the Allies. After the Japanese troops 
had surrendered, the Royal Thai Army was appointed by the Allies to disarm Japanese soldiers. 
According to the Allies, in September 1945 there were more than 100,000 Japanese soldiers in 
Thailand. Their weapons were seized and kept in arms dumps throughout the country waiting 
for destruction. Many of these arms, however, entered the market by either arms traders or 
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corrupt military officials. Just a couple of months before the war ended, the Allies had also 
delivered large supplies of arms to Thailand. The amount of these supplies is estimated at 175 
tons in total. These supplies were meant to be used by the Free Thai Movement, an underground 
resistance movement founded by Pridi Banomyong for fighting against the Japanese. Yet, with 
the war suddenly over, these arms were kept in secret despots of the Free Thai Movement. 
Later they were taken by some former Free Thai officers into the arms market as well.169 
 This overwhelming amount of over-stocked arms in Thailand was certainly attractive 
for whoever was looking for war materials. In early 1946, Suryono Darusman, an Indonesian 
activist in Singapore, started to look for sources of weapons. He was then joined by two other 
Indonesians, one of whom was Ishak Mahdi, a man who later became representative of the 
Republic in Bangkok. Another person was an officer of the Indonesian Army Intelligence, 
Bagdja Nitidiwirya. In June 1946, they entered into an agreement with a Singaporean Chinese 
who could obtain arms and military gears from the Changi Naval Base in Singapore. The 
cargoes finally arrived in Java in September 1946.170 
 During the same period of time, these three Indonesians must have made contacts with 
Thai people as well. On December 29, 1946, Mahdi reported the progress of his mission to 
Abdul Karim, the secretary general of the Bank of Indonesia. He told Karim about an 
agreement he made with a high ranking Thai official regarding the shipping of arms into the 
Republic and the selling of Javanese sugar.171 The Indonesians may have planned to pay for 
arms using the money from the sugar trade just as they had done with the aforementioned deal 
in Singapore. 
 This Thai official was Luang Suchitra, the former permanent secretary at the Ministry 
of Education in 1945 and lecturer at Chulalongkorn University. He and some staff from the 
Thai Navy secretly provided the Republic with a stockpile of US-made weapons worth 
1,750,000 Straits dollars. When the cargoes were ready for shipping, they paid for flights and 
four-week accommodation for the three Indonesian activists so that they could come to 
Bangkok and check the cargoes. Unfortunately, this deal fell through because of the Dutch 
blockade.172 From the fact that this group of Thai officials did not sell weapons on behalf of 
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the government, it may be assumed that they misused their authority in accessing arms depots 
for their personal profit. 
 A new attempt to buy arms in Thailand came in 1947. Oemar Selamat, a Javanese 
colonel in the Republican army, printed a large quantity of counterfeit 100 baht banknotes in 
Singapore. The total value of these fake bills was two million baht. Selamat had fled from 
Singapore before the police raided his place in August.173 It is not known when he came back 
to Singapore, but in October 1947, Chamnong Brusuwongse, a member of the Indonesian 
Independence League, went to see him in Singapore regarding the shipping of arms.174 It was 
likely that Selamat planned to pay for arms with counterfeit Thai banknotes. However, in 
December, he was arrested in Penang before any transaction occurred. According to the Dutch 
intelligence service, the arms trade was carried out by Chamnong and would be paid with gold 
instead of counterfeit banknotes. It is not known whether this deal finally succeeded or not.175 
 There is also an interesting story about Chamnong. When he was dealing in the arms 
trade, he had a letter signed by several politicians in Pridi’s leftist party. The letter addresses 
Hatta, the vice president of the Republic. It says: 
  
The fighting spirit of all Indonesian people is always tolerable in Siam. We know 
already … that Indonesia is badly in need of something which is very important 
and we have arranged everything …, remember war arrangement must always be 
prepared. We beg to introduce you … Chamnong Brusuwongse is from our party. 
He can be trusted ….176 
 
From the above mentioned letter, it is clear that Oemar and Chamnong were in contact with 
some Thai leftist politicians for weapons. It is difficult to know the real reason behind the offer. 
However, from the content of the letter, it may be concluded that personal profit was not the 
only reason, as in the case of Luang Suchitra. The anti-colonial idea also played a part in this 
offer. 
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 While some officials in the Thai government were involved in these cases of arms 
trafficking, agreements were not made under the name of the government. There is one case, 
however, in which an agreement was reached between the Republican government and the 
Thai government. The discussion of this deal may have started in August 1948. During the 
period of August 29-31, four people from Thailand visited Sukarno and Hatta in Yogyakarta. 
The Dutch legation in Bangkok was informed that they went there to make a secret trade 
agreement (see Chapter 1). 
 This trade agreement originated from the Indonesia Office in Penang. On September 8, 
1948, Dutch intelligence reported that a staff member of the Indonesia Office in Penang had a 
discussion with the Thai consulate in Penang about trade. The Republic wanted to barter petrol 
from Aceh for rice and American goods. From the report, it appears that the Thai government 
would take care of transport and necessary cash advances.177 More information on this deal 
was obtained through an Indonesian spy, a certain Hardjo. The Dutch Consulate in Singapore 
sent him to infiltrate the Republicans in Penang. From this spy, the Dutch learned that the Thai 
Consulate gave an Indonesian trafficker, Syahrif Lubis, a travel document and an introduction 
letter which he could hand to Thai officials in Phuket. On October 25, Lubis departed from 
Penang to Phuket.178 
 There was another interesting attempt to traffic arms in 1948. This attempt can be seen 
as confirmation that arms trade mostly occurred out of an economic motive rather than an 
ideological one. On August 14, Polderman, the Dutch charge d’affaires in Bangkok, told the 
chief of the Far East Department that a “well known businessman” in Bangkok, as a 
middleman, would like to sell a stock of weapons owned by the Free Thai Movement to the 
government of the Netherlands East Indies. According to Polderman, the seller was “afraid” 
that this stock of weapons may fall into Republican’s hands. In any case, Polderman received 
a negative answer from Jakarta on August 26.179  
 As I have written earlier, four people from Thailand made a trip to Yogyakarta between 
August 29-31, three of them were Thai and undoubtedly had something to do with the Thai 
government. The fourth person was an American businessman who owned a silk company in 
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Bangkok, Jim Thompson. One may ask why a businessman who sold silk fabric was also in 
the group. However, as it appeared, Thompson was not just a businessman. During WWII, he 
was recruited to work in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the war-time American 
intelligence agency. As an OSS agent, Thompson worked with the Free Thai Movement. After 
the war, ex-OSS officers including Thompson still had close relationships with Pridi and the 
Free Thai Movement.180 Considering Thompson’s profile and that the period in which a 
businessman visited Polderman and got his offer rejected coincides with the period in which 
Thompson was in Yogyakarta, it seems likely that Thompson was the one who had called on 
Polderman in mid-August. If this suspicion is right, Thompson may have turned to the 
Republicans after his offer to the Dutch had been turned down. In this case, it means that 
Thompson was looking to sell arms to any party willing to pay the right price, regardless of 
ideology. 
 Nevertheless, these cases were just a small part of the whole trade activities of the 
Republic. Major trades were done between the Republic and Singapore through extensive 
networks of Chinese merchants. Yet, trades between the Republic and Thailand increased after 
the Second Police Action. This was because the center of trades in Sumatra had moved to Aceh, 
which is closer to Phuket than Singapore. Moreover, it became more difficult to trade with the 
British colonies since the British, under Dutch pressure, stepped up their control of trades with 
the Republic.181 
 The staff of Indonesia Office in Bangkok probably started to approach Thai officials in 
Phuket in March 1949. Ishak Mahdi and John Coast visited Udom Bunyaprasob, the governor 
of Phuket, to ask for permission to trade. According to Coast, Udom did not object their request 
and also introduced the two Republicans to officials in the Customs office.182  
 After the Indonesian Republicans in Bangkok had contacted the Thai authority in 
Phuket, the next step was carried out by a trading company in Aceh. In April 1949, Aceh 
Trading Corporation (ATC) introduced John Lie, a major in the Indonesian Navy, to the 
military governor of Aceh because he would be the person who transported goods to and from 
Phuket. John Lie together with Sunar Suraputra was appointed by the Navy on May 3 to take 
up trade activities outside the Republic. Later, on May 19, the military governor of Aceh sent 
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a letter to the governor of Phuket saying that Indonesian Republicans would bring goods worth 
70,000 Straits dollars to Thailand and would, in turn, purchase goods worth the same value for 
the Republic.183 
 ATC was one of the branches of a big trading company called Central Trading 
Corporation (CTC), which was established in 1948 at Hatta’s initiative. This company was a 
military trade organization.184 John Lie first came to Singapore in August 1947 and worked as 
a blockade-runner. He transported goods with his speedboat between Republican ports and 
Singapore and Malaysia. Later, he had to move his base from Penang to Phuket because of the 
strict control by the British authorities.185   
 While the process of contacting the Thai authority in Phuket was still ongoing during 
April and May 1949, goods from Aceh had already arrived. According to Twang Peck Yang, 
a large amount of Indonesian rubber was being re-exported from Phuket starting in April. The 
Dutch consulate in Singapore also reported that John Lie appeared in Bangkok for the third 
time on May 15 after he had brought 50 tons of rubber to Phuket on behalf of ATC. In Phuket, 
Lie was also about to bring weapons that were sold to him by some Thais back to Aceh.186 
According to Usman Adamy, the general manager of ATC, the company could earn a lot from 
the trades with Phuket. In April 1949, ATC had at its disposal capital worth one million, with 
a profit of several hundred thousand Straits dollars.187 
 It is seen here that goods were transported from Aceh to Phuket by John Lie, the 
blockade-runner. However, Lie made a statement that a shipping firm should be set up because 
of the lack of means for transportation. He said, in 1949, that there were goods in Aceh worth 
a million Straits dollars waiting for transportation. It may not have been possible for him to 
transport these goods alone. Consequently, Sunar Suraputra, a major in the Indonesian Navy, 
and John Lie set up a shipping firm called Blue Ribbon Shipping Company (BRSC) to solve 
this problem.188 
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 This shipping company was partly financially supported by ATC and partly by the 
American Indonesian Corporation (AIC). The latter firm was a joint venture between the 
Indonesian Republican government and Matthew Fox. Fox and the Republicans reached an 
agreement in late 1947. AIC was founded according to the agreement and was meant to 
monopolize all trades of the Republic. Fox would receive a commission of 7.5 percent for every 
ton of goods that was sold and purchased by the Republic. To sponsor the shipping company, 
Fox appointed one of AIC’s staffs to work as advisor for BRSC. In the beginning of September 
1949, Lie also asked AIC for a loan which he used to finance BRSC.189 
 Surprisingly, a Thai firm was involved in this business as well. After AIC had been set 
up, John C. Lee, the vice president of the company, flew to Bangkok where he stationed his 
headquarters. From there he could fly to other major cities in Southeast Asia. Yet, a branch of 
AIC was not established in Bangkok. Lee stated that AIC adopted “the policy of appointing 
local firms as agents and thus permitting them to share in trade profits.” A Thai company called 
Bangkok Brokerage Company (BBC) was appointed as agent in Thailand.190 Thus, this 
company was the one who actually handled trades with the Indonesians for AIC. 
 What was interesting about BBC was that several shareholders were members of the 
Thai elite. Among them were Prince Viwat, the minister of finance; Phot Sarasin, the vice 
foreign minister; Prince Vimvathit Rabhibhadhana, the director general of Revenue 
Department; and Thawi Bunyaket, the ex-prime minister. The Dutch diplomat expressed what 
he thought of this company. He said: “through this connection (BBC), Fox can get in with main 
figures in Thai political and financial circles.”191  
 AIC and BBC must have been excellent business partners. When Matthew Fox arrived 
in Bangkok on January 6, 1950, an elaborate Chinese feast was provided for him by people 
from BBC.192 At this point, it is understandable why trades with the Republic went on without 
troubles from the Thai government. Thai politicians, civil servants, and royals who owned the 
brokerage firm definitely did not want anything to hinder the Thai-Indonesian trades, for it 
could adversely affect their substantial commissions. In other words, personal economic 
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interests motivated the Thai elites to support the Thai-Indonesian trades even though goods 
like weapons may have been involved. 
 Eventually, trades between Thailand and the Republic came to an end. Since 
negotiations between the Netherlands and the Republic were going well and Indonesia was 
promised its independence, Machsoes, the head of Indonesia Office in Penang, thought that 
there were no reasons to continue the illicit trade with Thailand. Therefore, he came to Bangkok 
in November 1949 to liquidate the import-export business between Sumatra and Phuket.193 
 
2.4 Summary 
 
Although Thailand did not support the Republic diplomatically, it played three other crucial 
roles during the Indonesian revolution. As this chapter has shown, POAS, a Bangkok-based 
airline, operated charter flights between the Republican capital, Yogyakarta, and Bangkok. 
Therefore, Thailand was a significant channel that bridged the Republic of Indonesia to the 
outside world. Thailand was also used as a temporary base during some clandestine missions 
of the Indonesians. Republican aircrafts usually came to Southern Thailand for various reasons. 
For example, they refueled and waited for further commands at Songkhla airfield. Last but not 
least, Thailand was another notable trade partner of the Republic alongside Singapore. Trades 
with Thailand generated substantial revenue out of which the Republic could pay for needed 
materials.  
 Surprisingly, the Thai government never took strong measures against the activities of 
the Indonesian Republicans in Thailand. It simply turned a blind eye to the Indonesians. In this 
respect, it may be concluded that Thailand, while not officially supporting the Republic through 
diplomacy, tacitly aided the Republic through other means. Whether the Thai government took 
this stance because it expected the Republic to be Thailand’s future neighbor is difficult to 
ascertain. Yet, three simpler explanations may be drawn from the sources. Corruption seems 
to be the most important contributing factor why the Thai government did not interfere with 
activities of the Republicans. Several members of the Thai elite, including heads of various 
government departments, high ranking civil and military officials, as well as royal members, 
were involved in businesses that were related to activities of the Republicans. These people 
could definitely influence the government to overlook the Indonesians. The second reason lies 
in the fear of the Thai government. In 1948, there was an insurgency by the Thai Muslim 
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population in the southern provinces. The Thai government was afraid that strong measures 
against the Indonesians might worsen the situation in the South. Ideology comes in third place. 
In my opinion, it was probably the least important reason that made the activities of the 
Republicans possible. Nevertheless, it cannot be entirely factored out. Konthi 
Suphamongkhon, who was in charge of aviation, for instance, permitted Republican charter 
flights even though the Dutch complained about them; and he did so at least in part because he 
was staunchly anti-colonial. 
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Conclusion 
 
On the road to independence, the Republic of Indonesia did not rely only on physical wars with 
the Dutch, but also on diplomacy. Throughout the four-year long conflict there was a long 
process of negotiations between the Netherlands and the Republic. Several important moments 
in this process were arbitrated by Western countries. These decisive roles of mediators have 
led scholars who work on the Indonesian Revolution to focus primarily on the roles and the 
positions of Western countries. Consequently, the existing literature on the topic has largely 
overlooked the attitudes of countries in Southeast Asia towards the conflict, even though they 
would become the future neighbors of the Republic of Indonesia after the conflict had passed. 
This thesis aims to bring attention back to the region where Indonesia is located. Its objective 
is to examine the positions and roles of Thailand during the Indonesian Revolution. To this 
end, it asks how both official and unofficial relations between Thailand and the Republic 
developed when the Dutch-Indonesian conflict was going on.  
 The first chapter of this thesis looks at Thailand’s process of granting recognition to the 
Republic of Indonesia. It appears there was a short period in 1947 in which Thailand, under a 
leftist government, sympathized with the struggle of the Indonesians and was about to 
recognize the Republican government – which would have made it one of the earliest countries 
to do so. However, the plan was halted by a military coup in November which put a rightist 
government into power. After the coup, Phibun, the ex-prime minister who took Thailand into 
WWII on the Axis side, was appointed by the army as prime minister again. To rebrand himself, 
Phibun became mindful of the attitudes of former Allied powers, especially the US and the 
UK, in terms of their foreign policies. The Thai government therefore adopted a policy of 
neutrality in world politics. Regarding the Dutch-Indonesian conflict, the Thai government 
officially recognized the sovereignty of the Dutch over the Indonesian archipelago and 
maintained friendly diplomatic relations with the Netherlands until the very end of the conflict. 
On the world stage, the Thai delegation was always instructed to stay neutral by avoiding 
casting votes or expressing opinions on the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. Nevertheless, the Thai 
government began to change its position during the final round of negotiations, the so-called 
Round Table Conference. Suddenly, just about ten days before the Netherlands transferred 
sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia, Thailand granted a de facto recognition to the 
Republic of Indonesia. 
 In the second chapter of this thesis, attention is shifted from official diplomatic relations 
to unofficial relations between Thailand and the Republic, i.e., the trades and the movements 
  
62 
of people between the two countries. While Thailand and the Republic of Indonesia did not 
establish diplomatic relations with each other until late, some of the activities of the Indonesian 
Republicans were conducted in or involved Thailand. Because of its central location in the 
region of Southeast Asia, Bangkok was chosen to be the place that connected the republican 
capital, Yogyakarta, to the outside world. The Republicans in Bangkok opened an air route 
between Thailand and the Republic by arranging charter flights with the Bangkok-based airline 
POAS. The charter flights, which brought people to and from the Republic, were in operation 
from mid-1948 until the end of that year. Although the Dutch legation in Bangkok complained 
about these flights to the Thai government, there was no effective attempt from the latter to 
stop POAS’s operation. The only attempt to stop POAS occurred in July 1948. The Thai Civil 
Aviation Board sent out instructions for charter flights to airline companies in Bangkok. But a 
month after, the board recalled their instructions and never introduced any other measure again.  
 Thailand was not only a bridge connecting the Republic to the outside world, but it was 
also a place where pilots who worked for the Republic could make a stopover during their 
missions. During the Indonesian Revolution, the Republic sold large amounts of opium to 
generate revenue. Some of the opium was transported to Singapore by planes. After unloading 
the opium, the Republican planes would fly further to Songkhla, a province in the south of 
Thailand. There, their planes would be refueled with the help of Thai airfield staff. Republican 
planes could wait in Songkhla until their returning cargoes were ready at a rendezvous location 
somewhere outside Thailand. Then they would pick up their cargoes and fly back to the 
Republic. Sometimes the republican planes also flew to Bangkok to pick up cargoes. Despite 
the fact that Republican planes had no landing rights, the Thai authorities did not cause them 
troubles. In fact, there was tacit support from some Thai elites. 
 Trading was another activity that involved Thailand. During the Indonesian Revolution, 
the Republic mainly traded with Singapore, but some deals were struck with Thailand as well. 
The early deals made in 1946 and 1947 were trades of weapons. Some Thai civil and military 
officials were involved in these trades for their personal interests. It appears the Thai 
government did not interrupt trading activities. There was even a case where the Thai 
government negotiated an agreement with the Republic to barter goods for petrol. 
 Nevertheless, trades between Thailand and the Republic remained insignificant until 
after the Second Police Action, when the centre of the Republican trades moved to Aceh, which 
was close to Phuket, an island in the south of Thailand. Trades between Thailand and the 
Republic thus increased. The headquarters of American Indonesian Corporation was located in 
Bangkok. The company was a joint venture between Matthew Fox, an American businessman, 
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and the government of the Indonesian Republic. This company had a monopoly in trades 
between the Republic and other countries. In Thailand, it appointed a company owned by 
several Thai elites to handle its business.  
 Similar to the other cases mentioned earlier, the Thai government did not restrict trades 
between the Republicans and Thai people. The Republic of Indonesia could generate income 
and purchase necessary materials from Thailand up to the point when it obtained its 
independence. 
 From the two chapters of this thesis, it can be concluded that Thailand developed 
limited diplomatic relations with the Republic and did not support the Republic’s position in 
the international arena. Nonetheless, Thailand had important unofficial roles in the Indonesian 
Revolution. For instance, Bangkok was one of a few places that linked the Republic to the 
outside world. Songkhla was used as base during clandestine missions of the Republicans and 
Phuket was an important trade center when the Republic could hardly trade with Singapore or 
Malaya. Thanks to unofficial and indirect support from the Thais, these activities could be done 
successfully. 
 From these empirical findings, one may characterize the position of Thailand in the 
Dutch-Indonesian conflict as a hypocritical neutrality. This is because Thailand pretended to 
be neutral by avoiding its participation in the conflict. However, it appears Thailand did not 
strictly act according to the definition of “neutrality”. On the one hand, Thailand officially 
acknowledged the Netherlands’ sovereignty over the Indonesian archipelago almost 
throughout the entire period of the Indonesian Revolution. In this respect, it can be seen that 
Thailand actually supported the Netherlands and thereby was not really neutral. The reason 
why Thailand acted this way was threefold. Firstly, Thailand under Phibun’s government 
wanted to please former Allied powers, especially the UK and the US. This is because Phibun 
wanted to erase the picture of him allying with the Axis powers during WWII. Since the 
Netherlands was also a member of the Allies, Phibun may have adopted the same policy on 
this issue. Secondly, since Thailand had never been colonized, Phibun and his government did 
not really sympathize with the fight against colonialism and did not share the same spirit that 
other countries in Asia may have had. Without a strong ideology against colonialism, there was 
no reason for Thailand to officially support the Republic, especially as long as there was a 
possibility that the Republicans could be crushed at any time. Thirdly, the Thai government 
had no choice but to keep a friendly relationship with the Dutch at least because of one practical 
reason. The Thai government needed help from the Dutch in bringing back the corpse of a Thai 
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royalty from Bandung to Bangkok. Thanks to Dutch help, the corpse was eventually 
transported to Thailand in September 1948. 
 On the other hand, unofficial support that Thailand gave the Republicans during the 
conflict suggests that Thailand did not completely take the Dutch side. While the Thai 
government did not establish diplomatic relations with the republican government at the early 
stage, it did not prevent the Indonesian activists from carrying out their missions in Thailand. 
In most cases, the Thai authorities simply turned a blind eye to whatever the Indonesians did 
in the country. Several activities actually received tacit support from the Thai authorities as 
well.  There were various reasons behind this conduct. Firstly, Thailand had a problem with 
the Muslim population in the southern provinces during the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. There 
was an insurgent group that wanted to separate their provinces from the country. The Thai 
government was afraid that strong measures against the Indonesians could stir dissent among 
the population and would, in turn, worsen the situation in the South. Secondly, several high 
ranking civil servants, military officials, and politicians found that they could gain personal 
benefits from trading with the Indonesians or giving them tacit support. Lastly, some Thai civil 
servants sympathized with the struggle against colonialism. These people were followers of 
the former leftist prime minister, Pridi Banomyong. Although Pridi was ousted, some of his 
followers still worked for the Thai government. For example, Konthi Suphamongkhon, the 
director of the Western Politics department, helped the Indonesians by not obstructing with the 
illegal flights to and from the Republic. 
  In addition to the hypocritical neutrality, one may also characterize the stance of 
Thailand in the conflict as opportunistic because it changed its position according to the 
situation. In December 1949, the Thai government suddenly gave the Republic of Indonesia a 
de facto recognition about ten days before the Dutch transferred its sovereignty to the United 
States of Indonesia. Since the Dutch-Indonesian negotiations were going well, the Thai 
government must have calculated that Indonesia would soon become an independent neighbor. 
Therefore, it began to open a formal diplomatic channel with the Republic before the Republic 
gained sovereignty. Yet, the political status of Indonesia was still uncertain enough to the Thai 
government that it made the move tentatively by not giving a de jure recognition to the 
Republic. At the same time, it did not yet recognize the United States of Indonesia. This move 
actually corroborated the idea that the Thai government was opportunistic because it only tried 
to establish formal contact with the Republic when the latter was already enjoying full support 
from other nations. It should be noted that the supportive stance of the US towards the Republic 
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in the latter stage must have been one reason why Thailand decided to shift its own position on 
the issue. 
 The study of Thai-Indonesian relations suggests similar characteristics of the Thai 
foreign policy during 1945-1950 as shown in the existing literature on the topic. In general, 
this thesis agrees that Thailand adopted a policy of neutrality before it fully aligned with the 
US in 1950. This can be seen from the way in which Thailand developed its diplomatic relations 
with the Republic and the Netherlands. The fact that Thailand under the Pridi regime was 
working towards recognizing the Republican government corroborates Shad’s argument of 
Thai sympathy towards the struggle against colonialism during 1945-1947.194 The suspension 
of recognition and the limited diplomatic relations between Thailand and the Republic in 1948 
indicated that Thailand shifted to a more pro-Western stance. Moreover, Phibun’s concern over 
the US attitudes actually shows that the US became important in the thinking of Thai foreign 
policy from 1948 onwards. These findings corroborate the argument that Thailand was moving 
closer to the West over the course of 1948-1950.195 However, the study of Thai-Indonesian 
relations also shows that Thailand did not completely stop giving unofficial support to the 
Republic, even if it officially took a pro-Western stance. This fact suggests a contradiction 
between the official and the unofficial level of Thai foreign policy during the Indonesian 
Revolution.  
  This thesis also agrees with the existing literature of the Indonesian Revolution that the 
US was an important factor in settling the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. In addition to making 
members of the UN bodies support Indonesia and pressuring the Dutch to give Indonesia 
independence, the findings of this thesis show that Thailand developed both official and 
unofficial relations with the Republic according to the stance of the US.196 This can be clearly 
seen when Phibun allowed the Republicans to open the Bangkok-Yogyakarta air route because 
he thought such flights were not of US concern. The fact that Thailand was mindful of the 
attitude of the US implies that the US must have been powerful in world politics after WWII. 
 While the literature of the Indonesian Revolution tends to over-stress the roles of 
Singapore in giving Indonesia unofficial and indirect support in the form of trades, this thesis 
obviously shows that Singapore was not the only location that offered such support.197 Thailand 
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played a crucial part as trade partner and aviation center. For instance, Bangkok was the 
headquarters of American Indonesian Corporation (AIC), the firm that tried to monopolize the 
trades of the Republic with other countries. The existence of AIC actually suggests a wider 
Southeast Asian trade network in which Myanmar and the Philippines were also included. 
 However, the case of Thai-Indonesian relations contradicts with Crowl’s argument 
regarding the structure of world politics. According to Crowl, Indian and Australian support 
for the Republic paved the way for a cooperation among the newly emerging countries. This 
cooperation aligned neither with the US nor the USSR. However, Thailand did not assisted the 
Republic because it shared the solidarity among newly emerging countries. As mentioned 
earlier, Thailand did not really sympathize with the struggle against colonialism because it had 
itself never been colonized. Illegitimate private gains of the Thai elites were the real drive 
behind the Thai support. Moreover, the stance of the US was an important factor in the making 
of Thai foreign policy. Therefore, the Thai support should not be seen as an example of the 
cooperation among newly emerging countries. In contrast, the Thai support was a result of Thai 
alignment with the US.198 
 As previous literature on the Indonesian Revolution has given attention mainly to 
Western countries, this study of how Thailand and Indonesia developed their relationship may 
be seen as an initial step towards shedding light on the positions of countries in Southeast Asia. 
To conclude, the stance of Thailand in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict was a hypocritically 
neutral one. While the pro-Western policy made Thailand support the Netherlands 
diplomatically by acknowledging the latter’s sovereignty over the Indonesian archipelago, 
corruption and internal affairs made Thailand give tacit support to the Republic. On top of that, 
the attitude of the US was a crucial factor that determined the Thai actions during the 
Indonesian Revolution.  
 Nevertheless, this thesis is not yet a conclusive study. Its limitations lie in the shortage 
of Thai sources. Most of the materials used in this thesis are from Dutch archives and inevitably 
contain the Dutch perspective. In order to fully understand the positions and roles of Thailand, 
future research would need to examine documents from the Thai authorities, to better 
understand the motivations and trains of thought of the important Thai actors.  
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